Thea Riofrancos

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From Petro-Nationalism to Post-Extractivism in Ecuador

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

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

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book began before I knew it would be a book, before I knew I would be admitted into a PhD program, and before I knew I was conducting what would in hindsight constitute the preliminary fieldwork for my dissertation. It was born in late 2007 with a decision that was equal parts spontaneous and deliberate to move to Ecuador with Daniel Denvir, my partner and co-adventurer then and since. We were drawn by the country's natural landscapes, rebellious uprisings, and by what we understood was the beginning of a momentous political transformation: after decades of social mobilization, the country's first democratically elected leftist president had been inaugurated, and had promised a constituent assembly to rewrite the constitution, an end to the long night of neoliberalism, and sovereignty from US hegemony. Over the three years prior to this decision, Daniel and I had been active in PCASC, a Portland-based Latin American solidarity organization, and had lived and traveled elsewhere in the region where the Left had already come to power. We knew that the Left's electoral ascent was marked by both heady optimism and fraught relationships with the wide array of movements that had long struggled for social justice and popular power. We wanted to see how this process would unfold in Ecuador. Right away, we learned that resource extraction and indigenous rights would form the intertwined sites of contestation between the leftist government and the social movements that were still, at that moment but not for much longer, its allies. I knew that these two issues had long been central to radical politics in the region, but had never before witnessed a Left so internally riven by disagreements over the model of development, the relationship between society and nature, and the territorial self-determination of indigenous nations and peoples. It was an immersive educational experience, and I found myself challenged by political questions I had never thought to pose. It was in this moment that this book was born.

As is already apparent from this brief autobiographical narrative, I am in no sense the sole author of the pages that follow. My arguments and observations were articulated in constant conversation with Daniel and with the many people we met and formed long relationships with in Ecuador. They drew on a prior set of analyses developed in my undergraduate thesis on social

movements and economic policy in Bolivia, written under the guidance of my adviser Casiano Hacker-Cordón at Reed College. I am forever indebted to Casiano's intellectual mentorship. He encouraged me to unsettle the boundaries between academic subfields and disciplines, and between political commitments and scholarly research. His criticism—of my work and of the world—was always equal parts ruthless and generous; I aspire to emulate his example in my relationships with my own students.

From before I even officially matriculated at the University of Pennsylvania, Tulia Falleti was a constant source of support, encouragement, and intellectual rigor. She was a model of a dissertation adviser: with the knowledge that an ethnographic study of conflict over mining in Ecuador represented a triply marginalized topic in the discipline (on methodological, substantive topic, and case selection grounds), she simultaneously pushed me to articulate my ideas in terms intelligible to other scholars, believed that I could do it, and valued my work as a necessary challenge to hegemonic approaches in political science. She read and carefully commented on every chapter of my dissertation more than once. She also taught me how to structure my writing on a demanding but achievable timeline, and how to graciously receive critique while always giving me the space to push back against her own authority. And she inspired my interest in the fundamental territoriality of politics and in the myriad institutional arrangements for linking geographic scale and democratic governance.

The other members of my dissertation committee also went beyond the call of duty. Anne Norton helped me draw out the deeper questions at stake in my work: What is a community, and what practices and identities bind it together or tear it apart? What is the content of sovereignty? How do the seemingly neutral realms of the law and science become politicized? What are the complex subjectivities and temporalities at play in a fight against an extractive sector still in its early stages? Who speaks for the land, the water, and the resources we hold in common? I still wrestle with these questions, and to the extent that this book sketches the outlines of how one might answer them, I am indebted to her. Robert Vitalis taught me to distrust just about everything already written on resource politics and the rentier state, to dispense with prepackaged concepts, to listen to the actors on the ground, and to trace the history that emerged from my encounters with people, events, and archives. He encouraged me to search out the fissures within the state and to pay close attention to the everyday practices of bureaucracy. And he always brought his expansive insight on oil politics in the Middle East to bear on my research in Ecuador, helping me specify both what was shared across contexts and what

was unique to my fieldwork sites. From Erica Simmons, I learned both how to work against the grain of political science and still participate in and enrich the debates within the field. Her work on social movements and the politics of subsistence broadened my conceptual horizons: disputes over the management or ownership of natural resources are always disputes over the meanings we ascribe to them, and the contested ways that political communities are built through and around extraction, production, and consumption.

In addition to my committee, I want to note the support and intellectual influence of other members of the department, especially Jeffrey Green, Ian Lustick, Julia Lynch, Rudra Sil, and Rogers Smith. And lastly, outside political science, my fieldwork experience, dissertation, and book benefited immeasurably from the courses I took and the mentorship I received from Asif Agha, professor of linguistic anthropology and social theory polymath. It is not an overstatement to say that Asif taught me how language works, how—through the words we speak, write, and read—we reflexively constitute social life, linking, in webs of interaction, a casual conversation to the assembly of macropolitical orders. My analysis of *extractivismo* discourse is unthinkable without the lessons I learned in his seminars.

Throughout graduate school, I participated in intellectual communities both on and off campus, and made what would be deep and lasting friendships. I survived intimidating seminars, impossible reading loads, comprehensive exams, dissertation proposals, and fieldwork with the companionship of Begüm Adalet, Osman Balkan, Laura Finch, Kathryn Hardy, Ian Hartshorn, Adam Leeds, Shy Oakes, and, from a distance, Isabel Gabel. I would never, ever have written a dissertation without the camaraderie of my writing crew (Adam, Laura, Kathryn, and Shy). These four and many more were also involved in a rotating series of off-campus social theory reading groups, held in the living rooms and finished late in the night on the front porches of West Philly, and which included undergrads, grad students, and unaffiliated scholars. They are the closest thing I have experienced to something like a salon, unencumbered by the sometimes stifling norms of the classroom.

My year and a half of fieldwork was enabled by yet another community of generous individuals and groups. I am grateful for the institutional home FLACSO provided (coordinated by Santiago Basabe), and for the opportunity to present my research and work with graduate students. I appreciate the many conversations I had with Veronica Albuja, Abel Arpi, Juan Auz, Chela Calle, Kléver Calle, David Chavez, Paúl Cisneros, Luis Corral, Pablo Iturralde, Carlos Larrea, Patricio Matute, Nayana Román, and William Sacher—several of whom also invited me into their political and intellectual worlds, resulting in bonds

of friendship and solidarity that I hope this book reflects and honors. I also benefited from the fieldwork companionship of Nicholas Limerick, Taylor Nelms, and Karolien van Teijlingen, as well as that of Elisa Levy and Sander Otten, with whom I experienced the 2012 march and 2011 *consulta*, respectively, and who were generous enough to give me permission to use their photographs of these processes. My life in Ecuador was enriched tremendously by Robin Fink, with whom I shared an apartment and many formative life experiences. And, finally, Marcelo Torres (Lino): dear friend, confidante, and wise beyond his years. Together we explored the many marvelous worlds of Quito and beyond—both more deeply understanding and transforming ourselves in the process.

The chapters that comprise this book went through countless revisions and reframings. My first attempts to think through converting my dissertation to a book occurred during my year as a Visiting Fellow at the Kellogg Institute of Notre Dame. Robert Fishman, Evan Harris, Sandra Ley Gutiérrez, Jamie Loxton, Ann Mische, and Antina von Schnitzler all provided invaluable feedback on the project as it developed. Over the past few years, Santiago Anria, Hannah Appel, Osman Balkan, Alyssa Battistoni, Guzman Castro, Daniel Aldana Cohen, Daniel Denvir, Gabriel Fonseca, Janice Gallagher, Kathryn Hardy, Evan Harris, Adam Leeds, Ian Hartshorn, Jeffrey Isaac, Joshua Simon, Dawn Teele, and Sarah Thomas all read drafts of one or more chapters, and provided rigorous commentary. Of all of these, Adam Leeds read the most drafts. I am deeply indebted to him, not only for his editorial genius, but for our decade-long close friendship, stimulating conversations, and shared intellectual development; it is hard to imagine writing this book without all I have learned from—and with—him. From book prospectus to final manuscript and all the late-night anxious queries in between, George Ciccariello-Maher has been much more than a series editor: a wise mentor and a dear friend, he believed in my work and in its relevance to the vibrant field of radical politics in the Americas. Courtney Berger was an exemplary editor, providing patient and constructive guidance throughout the entire process. And I benefited from the feedback of two anonymous reviewers, whose comments pushed me to broaden the manuscript's analytic scope and zoom out to the dilemmas marking the Pink Tide writ large.

In Providence, I have had the fortune of the friendship and near constant companionship of Sarah Thomas. At Providence College, I have had the unusual luck of an extremely supportive and convivial department. In particular, I would like to thank Chairs Bill Hudson and Joseph Cammarano for doing all in their power to give me time to devote to research and writing, the college's

CAFR grant for funding follow-up fieldwork and archival research, and two indispensable research assistants, Christian Balasco and Taylor Gibson.

I want to acknowledge Alyssa Battistoni and Daniel Aldana Cohen again, for helping me draw the connections between conflict over extraction in Ecuador, and the urgent and intertwined challenges of climate change and socio-economic inequality. Both pushed me to elucidate the planetary stakes of local struggles over oil and mining, and have encouraged me to intervene in debates well beyond the confines of academia.

I now return to where I started these acknowledgments. Daniel Denvir, you are the love of my life, a bedrock of support, and a constant inspiration. I can only aspire to match your discipline and your unwavering commitment to justice. You have accompanied me, whether physically or in spirit, on every single moment of the journey along which this book was conceived, written, rewritten, and submitted.

And, finally: Maro Riofrancos and Joyce Ilson—critical thinkers, nonconformers, and loving parents—you always encouraged me to take risks and question authority in all its forms, read to me and taught me to love reading, and opened my eyes to the joys of travel, the value of curiosity, and the beauty of New York City in its infinite diversity. Thank you.

Earlier versions of portions of Chapters 1 and 2 appeared, in a different form, in *Cultural Studies*, while an earlier version of Chapter 4 appeared in *Perspectives on Politics*. Sections of the Conclusion contain revised text and ideas that were first published in essays in *Dissent*, *n+1*, and *Jacobin* magazines.

Resource Radicalisms

To legitimate a supposed image of the left, the government uses a discourse that makes it appear radical, but it is a double discourse . . . The rights of nature and indigenous territories are recognized in name only, the extractivist model that the government advocates contradicts them and brutally attacks them . . . But the other reality is that of the [indigenous] peoples, the social movements and organizations that today resist this model, just as yesterday we resisted neoliberalism.

—"The Manifesto of the Meeting of Social Movements for Democracy and Life," Quito, 2011

It is madness to say no to natural resources, which is what part of the left is proposing—no to oil, no to mining, no to gas, no to hydroelectric power, no to roads. This is an absurd novelty, but it's as if it has become a fundamental part of left discourse. It is all the more dangerous for coming from people who supposedly speak the same language. With so many restrictions, the left will not be able to offer any viable political projects . . . We cannot lose sight of the fact that the main objective of a country such as Ecuador is to eliminate poverty. And for that we need our natural resources.

—Rafael Correa, "Ecuador's Path," 2012

In 2011, the fourth year of the administration of Ecuadorian leftist president Rafael Correa, more than a hundred social movement organizations and leftist political parties gathered for the "Meeting of Social Movements for Democracy and Life." According to the manifesto written at this meeting, these organizations and parties were rooted in diverse experiences of social mobilization, including anti-mining, environmentalist, public transit worker, feminist, and sexual diversity struggles, and "the indigenous and peasant uprising for water and land."[1] They condemned Correa's

government for "represent[ing] an authoritarian and corrupt model of capitalist modernization."

Popular movements had rebuked prior governments for being antidemocratic and neoliberal. But this document also deployed a new critical category: "the extractivist model," defined as a political-economic order based on the intensive extraction and export of natural resources.[2] The manifesto stated that this model, with its blatant disregard for nature and indigenous communities, was all the more pernicious for being shrouded in a "supposed image of the left" and "a double discourse"—and must be as militantly resisted as neoliberalism had been in the recent past.

A year later, in an interview in the Chilean leftist magazine *Punto Final*, and during protracted political conflict with many of these same social movements, President Correa charged that rejecting the extractive model was a "colossal error" that was particularly "lethal because it utilizes our same language, proposes the same objectives and even invokes our same principles."[3] Correa grounded his arguments in appeals to the leftist canon, asking, "Where in *The Communist Manifesto* does it say no to mining?" and "What socialist theory says no to mining?" A few months later, in an interview in *New Left Review*, he expressed exasperation with what he saw as activists' "absurd" and "dangerous" opposition to resource extraction.[4]

While Correa and the organizations that signed the manifesto vehemently disagreed over the model of development, they did agree on one thing: to each, the other represented a perversion of leftism, a perversion particularly insidious for being cloaked in the language of radical transformation. Each side accused the other of betraying the principles of socioeconomic equality, popular empowerment, and anti-imperialism that have defined the Latin American Left for over a century. Correa identified himself with a regional movement of "socialism for the twenty-first century," named neoliberalism as the cause of myriad social, economic, and political ills, rejected US hegemony, and presided over a state that had dramatically increased social spending and that enjoyed widespread political support among the poor. His discourse resonated with a long history of popular calls for the expropriation and nationalization of natural resources. The anti-extractive social movements that opposed him traced their organizational lineage to worker, campesino, and indigenous struggles, and their critique of the extractive model was indebted to the systematic analysis of imperialism and dependency that characterizes Latin American critical thought. But they also voiced a more recent radical demand: an end to the extractive model of development.

Why did activists who had for decades resisted neoliberalism now protest against a leftist government? More generally, what accounts for the emergence of radical anti-extractive movements? And how might they reshape resource politics across the globe?

This book explores the conditions and consequences of the radical politicization of resource extraction. Dominant approaches to the study of oil or mineral-dependent states focus on how resource dependency shapes regime type or economic development.[5] They conclude that such states tend to be authoritarian and corrupt, and rule over societies that are alternately portrayed as politically quiescent or prone to violent resource-related conflicts. Completing this picture of pathology is economic underdevelopment. Some combination of Dutch disease, boom-and-bust price cycles, profligate state spending, and a pervasive "rentier mentality" is seen to divert investment away from productive sectors—thus reproducing resource dependency and all its perverse effects.[6]

In contrast, my approach rejects such pessimistic determinism and expands the study of resource politics well beyond the halls of the petro-state.[7] In Ecuador, grassroots activists were key protagonists in the contentious politics of oil and mining. In dynamic conflict with state and corporate elites, popular mobilization shaped the political and economic consequences of resource extraction. And the stakes of these conflicts were high. Constitutional authority, democratic sovereignty, and the possibility of a post-neoliberal state hung in the balance.

In the heat of political struggle, social movement activists craft critiques of extraction and enact processes of resistance. I call these *resource radicalisms*, and show how they shape the strategies, identities, and interests of state and movement actors alike. The concept of resource radicalism brings into relief how intellectual production is intertwined with political mobilization. From rallying cries to animated debates to everyday reflection, activists analyze the prevailing order and articulate visions of a world otherwise.

Drawing on an archival and ethnographic study of three decades of dramatic resource politics in Ecuador, I identify two such resource radicalisms, *radical resource nationalism* and *anti-extractivism*, each of which transformed the political terrain of extraction. The former demands collective ownership of oil and minerals; the latter rejects extraction entirely and envisions a post-extractive society. In the chapters that follow, I demonstrate that resource radicals forced state and corporate elites to respond—whether by accommodation, co-optation, or criminalization—and, in some cases, affected the fate of extractive projects.

Around the globe, conflict in relation to extraction, energy, and infrastructure has escalated—and it will only continue to do so in a rapidly warming and politically unstable world.[8] Situated at the frontiers of capitalism's relentless expansion, mining and oil projects are sites of dispossession and contamination. They are structured by local, national, and global scales of political economy and ecology.[9] As a result, they afford multiple venues of conflict. Due to their uneven geographic distribution, and that of their environmental and social impacts, natural resources are "intensely local."[10] At the same time, they are commodities in international supply chains shaped by the investment decisions of multinational firms and volatile global prices. Dangerous labor conditions and relative worker autonomy have historically made sites of extraction focal sites of class conflict. And these local conflicts also have national significance: governments around the world have taken an acute interest in regulating oil and mineral sectors since the early twentieth century, including via direct ownership of extractive firms.[11] As a key source of fiscal revenue, these sectors are considered "strategic"—a status justifying the deployment of physical force to protect extractive projects from protest or other disruptions. More fundamentally, in such national contexts, the processes of extraction and state-formation have reinforced each other.[12] Meanwhile, potent resource imaginaries, developed by movements and institutions, have shaped their political consequences.[13]

In Latin America, the politics of resource extraction are particularly charged. Across the region's diverse histories, resource extraction traces a long arc: colonial plunder, independence-era "enclave economies," midcentury nationalist projects of oil-fueled modernization, subsequent privatization and deregulation of hydrocarbon and mineral sectors, and, most recently, attempts at oil-funded equitable development. Over the course of four centuries, the extraction (or harvesting) and export of primary commodities has relegated the region to "peripheral" status in the global division of labor.[14] This status, rooted in colonial domination, places it on the losing end of an unequal exchange of raw goods for refined or manufactured imports. Dependency only intensified after independence, with the proliferation of mines and plantations that functioned as economic enclaves, often foreign-owned and with weak linkages to the rest of the national economy. Although the history of extraction is a history of underdevelopment, natural resource sectors have long inspired developmentalist ambitions on the part of state officials—and hopes of radical sovereignty on the part of popular movements.[15] Inspired by such visions, in the mid-twentieth century, several resource-dependent

Latin American countries underwent forms of "endogenous development," investing rents in industrial sectors. Their goal was to ultimately diversify economies and export revenues. But ensuing neoliberal reforms of deregulation and market integration reinforced the reliance on primary sectors—a trend only exacerbated by the commodity boom (between 2000 and 2014), and trade and financial dependency on the United States, Canada, Europe, and China.

Recent leftist administrations in Latin America are ideal sites to explore resource conflict because of this history, and because both policymakers and social movements have explicitly politicized—and radicalized—the relationship between development and extraction. In the process, they have raised deeper questions about the state, democracy, and the ecological foundations of global capitalism. Ecuador in particular is an especially revealing window into regional, and global, resource radicalisms. It is among the most commodity-dependent economies on the continent, and has seen intense conflict between a leftist government committed to an extraction-fueled, broad-based development model and an array of movements militantly opposed to resource extraction in all forms.

The Ecuadorian dispute over resource extraction between a self-described socialist leader and the social movement activists who helped bring him to power testifies to a unique historical moment. In Latin America, the turn of the millennium was marked by the proliferation of "counter-hegemonic processes" in the halls of state power and in the streets.[16] At the height of the Pink Tide in 2009, leftist administrations governed almost two-thirds of the region's population.[17] But this moment was also marked by the intensification of an export-oriented, resource-intensive model of accumulation, highly dependent on foreign capital. In Ecuador, activists who had protested decades of neoliberal policies in tandem with the region's leftist, critical, and decolonial intellectuals now resisted a leftist government and what they called "the extractive model" of development.[18]

The region is home to a variety of resource radicalisms. Depending on the context, activists' grievances and demands center on indigenous rights, environmental contamination, labor exploitation, foreign ownership, territorial autonomy, and local self-determination—or, often, some combination thereof. In some cases, disputes over extraction pit leftists with histories of common political struggle against one another. Leftist governments in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela espoused a state-centric resource nationalism, while indigenous and popular environmental movements (*ecológismo popular*) struggling against the expanding extractive frontier envisioned a post-extractive

future.[19] These movements articulated a novel critical discourse centered on the concept of extractivism that called into question the unity of state, nation, territory, and resources. Although this discourse has circulated transnationally in both activist and academic circles, in Ecuador the radicalization of resource politics was both particularly acute and historically dynamic.[20] It was acute because, during the presidential administration of Rafael Correa, the dispute over extraction became *the* primary source of discord between state actors and social movements—and among bureaucrats themselves. And it was historically dynamic because in the space of less than a decade, many popular sector organizations dramatically changed their position on resource extraction.[21] In response to the social and environmental impacts of extractive projects, they abandoned their historic calls for expropriation, nationalization, and the collective ownership of the means and products of extraction—what I call *radical resource nationalism*—and embraced *anti-extractivism*: the militant opposition to all forms of resource extraction. In the streets and in the courts, in popular assemblies in affected communities and on nature walks to the sites of planned extraction, they identified and resisted the disparate nodes of extractivism. From their perspective, each of these nodes reproduced the extractive model—and furnished an opportunity to disrupt its ubiquitous development.

Resource Governance

A central aim of this book is to identify models of *resource governance* and show how they structure and are structured by popular mobilization. Resource governance refers to "the political and economic coordination of socio-natural relations" on the part of state and corporate elites.[22] The prevailing paradigm of resource governance shapes the political consequences of, and conflicts around, dramatic shifts in commodity prices.

Such governance paradigms vary over time and across national contexts, are inflected with specific ideological commitments, and supported by distinct constituencies. From 1972 through the end of Correa's third administration in 2017, Ecuador saw three approaches to resource governance: oil-based developmentalism, neoliberalism, and post-neoliberal resource nationalism.[23] Continuities cut across these periods: each model of governance bequeathed institutional and ideological legacies that shaped subsequent moments of policymaking and protest.

My analysis attends to these continuities as well as the conflictual junctures at which resource governance is transformed. As the two epigraphs that

open this chapter highlight, during Correa's tenure in office (2007–2017), competing visions of resource extraction split the Ecuadorian Left, and opened up a debate over the means and ends of radical transformation. These competing visions emerged in a regional context characterized by two processes: the electoral success of leftist governments, and a sustained commodity boom. The causes of each were distinct, but once set in motion they together transformed political and economic horizons.

The electoral success of leftist politicians and parties in Latin America had causes both distant and proximate.[24] In any given case, the timing and character of successful leftist presidential campaigns can only be understood in light of the domestic balance of forces, the history of leftist, labor, urban barrio, campesino, and indigenous organizing, and the severity and consequences of neoliberal reforms. However, shared political and economic circumstances across the region help explain the simultaneous success of leftist electoral bids. Democratization was one such factor: although the risk of repression on the part of the domestic elite, and intervention by the US, has by no means disappeared, the wave of formal re-democratizations across the region in the late 1970s and 1980s opened up more political space for leftist parties to mobilize and compete. Second, decades of austerity had deepened poverty and inequality—and created a large constituency for leftist policies of economic redistribution, social welfare, and more substantive democratization of the state. Finally, and as crucial as re-democratization and economic devastation, was the role of sustained anti-neoliberal protest in politicizing neoliberal policies and challenging the hegemony of free markets and limited formal democracy.

Overlapping with the electoral ascendancy of the Left, between 2000 and 2014, demand from China (due to rapid industrialization and related growth in domestic consumer markets) drove historically high global commodity prices.[25] The trend was reinforced by disruptions to Middle Eastern and North African oil supplies (and associated investor panics) during the Arab Spring. In Latin America, the boom resulted in a substantial economic reorientation, and deepening fiscal dependency on the extraction and export of oil, metals, and agricultural commodities.[26] Commodity booms and busts, however, do not directly determine resource policy or the broader politics surrounding resource extraction. The prior decades of neoliberal deregulation across the region had enabled this rapid expansion of oil and mining development. As a result of global market integration, the activity of resource governance increasingly encompasses both public policymakers and private corporate actors, often in explicit partnership with one another.[27]

From Oil-Based Developmentalism to Neoliberalism

Soon after the discovery of oil in the northern Amazon in 1967 by Texaco-Gulf, oil policy in Ecuador took a nationalist and developmentalist turn. The first step toward resource nationalism began under the populist Velasco Ibarra government's fifth and final administration (1968–1972) with the 1971 Hydrocarbons Law, which declared oil the "inalienable property of the state," eliminated the concession model, and replaced it with a contract model that stipulated taxation and royalty rates, and required investments.[28] However, the law was not retroactive and the new contract model was voluntary. In February 1972, a military coup deposed the Ibarra administration. One motive was the prospect of asserting firmer state control over oil and using oil rents as a basis for national development. The historical moment was auspicious for nationalist oil policies. In the early 1970s, a wave of oil sector nationalizations swept the Middle East.[29] At the same time, the Group of 77—the UN caucus of Third World countries—increasingly advocated the shared interests of commodity exporters and the need for national control over these sectors.[30] Prices were on the rise as global demand grew, and several major producers were reaching their peak production levels.[31] In this context, the Rodríguez Lara government (1972–1976) made oil policy its central focus, and it explicitly framed its policies in terms of nationalism, developmentalism, and decolonization. Between June 1972 and March 1973, the military junta reestablished the national oil company, Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE), reviewed all existing concessions and limited their size (resulting in the return of over 5 million hectares to the state), forced the renegotiation of all contracts, and, most controversially, mandated that CEPE hold 25 percent of the rights to any contract.[32] In November 1973, Ecuador joined the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). With an eye to promoting broader socioeconomic development, the government reinvested oil revenues in a variety of industrial and petrochemical sectors, implemented land reform in the highlands, and promoted agricultural settlement ("colonization") in the Amazon.[33]

The nationalist policy of resource extraction and associated developmentalism was short-lived. The ensuing backlash from the domestic business class and foreign oil companies ended this brief but transformative experiment in resource nationalism and helped introduce neoliberal oil governance in 1980, which remained in place until 2006.[34] As I detail in Chapter 1, neoliberalism was marked by privatization and deregulation, with the aim of courting foreign investment. The proceeds from oil extraction were primarily realized as

corporate profits and foreign debt payments. Despite this radical shift in resource governance, however, the policies of the Rodríguez Lara government left an enduring ideological legacy of resource nationalism, which would later be reappropriated and radicalized by popular movements. It also bequeathed an institutional and organizational infrastructure (most importantly, the state-owned oil company) that would form the foundation of resource nationalist policies under the Correa administration.

Renewed Resource Nationalism

During the commodity boom, Ecuador became one of the most primary resource dependent economies in the region. Between 2000 and 2010, its five most important primary resources accounted for on average three–quarters of total exports, with oil alone accounting for almost half.[35] From Correa's inauguration in 2007 up until 2014 (and the precipitous drop in oil prices), oil revenues financed on average over one-third of the state budget.[36] Yet even when oil prices were high, social spending still outpaced revenues. Chinese loans, secured by future oil revenues, covered a substantial percentage of the budget shortfall.[37] By 2017, the government and the state-owned oil company, Petroecuador were over $17 billion in debt to the Chinese Development and Export-Import Banks.[38] Searching for a broader revenue base, Correa increasingly prioritized mining Ecuador's untapped gold and copper reserves, and drilling for oil in the southeastern Amazon. His administration was not the first to attempt to develop a large-scale mining sector in Ecuador. But, unlike previous governments, it made mining a national policy priority.[39] Out of five strategic projects, the administration's efforts resulted in contracts for two large-scale, open-pit copper mines (the Mirador mine in Zamora Chinchipe, and San Carlos-Panantza Project in Morona Santiago) and offers from foreign firms for four out of thirteen new oil concessions. Other mining projects are now in various stages of exploration, and some are stalled due to social conflict and investors' perceptions that the contract model overly favors the state.

In Ecuador and other South American countries governed by leftist administrations, the renewed ascendancy of resource nationalism shaped the social, economic, and political effects of the commodity boom.[40] In Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, legislative reforms and executive decrees stipulated contract models that increased state revenue from extractive projects (though often less dramatically than claimed by conservative opposition, and the US media) and/or increased the share of state ownership ("forced divestments").[41] In Ecuador, there were no expropriations or nationalizations

of foreign oil firms, but the oil contract model was reformed to increase the tax rate on extraordinary profits and to channel profits to the state in the event of production above forecasted levels, thus increasing state revenues when oil prices rose.[42] Similarly, the 2009 Mining Law increased royalty rates, and channeled a portion of revenues for investment in directly affected communities.

The combination of the commodity boom, the new contract models, and significantly increased state spending on basic needs began to chip away at what Correa called the "social debt" that had accumulated during hundreds of years of inequality and had intensified during the "lost decade" of debt crises and neoliberal policies. As a result, poverty and inequality declined significantly, and access to education, sanitation, housing, and healthcare increased.[43] Among Latin American countries, under the Correa administration, Ecuador spent the highest percentage of GDP on its monthly cash transfer program (*bono de desarrollo humano*).[44] And, compared to similar programs across the region, the *bono* accounted for the highest decrease in poverty and had the greatest redistributive effect.[45]

However, when it came to transforming historically unequal and dependent economies, commodity-dependent leftist populism was a double-edge sword. In Ecuador, the price of improving millions of citizens' socioeconomic well-being was further fiscal dependency on the extraction and export of natural resources, and the subjection of indigenous communities to sometimes violent displacement and of fragile ecosystems to contamination. Although during the boom years this model provided revenue for social spending, the truly "popular and solidary" economy officially promoted by the state proved elusive. In the context of an economy still dominated by oligopolistic consumer markets, state revenues were a boon to private sector firms. Substantial reductions in poverty and income inequality, and improvements across an array of health, sanitation, education, and housing indicators, coexisted with the persistent informality of work, inequality in land tenure, and, in some sectors, increasing concentration of capital.[46] In addition, the economy as a whole was vulnerable to commodity price volatility, as evidenced by the 2015 recession, which was triggered by a sharp decline in oil prices, and led to ensuing cuts in social spending. To wit, the budget for the aforementioned monthly *bono* was slashed by almost half in 2015.[47]

What ties together these seemingly contradictory outcomes is the availability of historically high resource rents, which enabled the Correa government to attend to social needs without deeper transformations in class relations. So long as there was an influx of oil rents, the income of the poor could be increased without expropriating the wealth of the rich. Juan Ponce and Rob Vos refer

to this dynamic as "redistribution without structural change."[48] Ultimately, it was the continued reliance on a primary-export model of accumulation that generated these persistent forms of precarity, inequality, and the concentration of wealth—and in part accounts for the subsequent political "retreat" of leftist governments.[49]

Thus, during the Pink Tide, in Ecuador and other South American countries, the transition from neoliberalism to a new, post-neoliberal version of resource nationalism was not a total rupture with prevailing power structures. The legacy of market reforms continued to shape the parameters of state intervention and corporate investment in resource sectors. Decades of the deregulation of resource markets had encouraged the sale of vast tracts of land for exploration and extraction, often to foreign oil and mining companies, for low prices, and with scant legal, environmental, or labor oversight. In addition, the years of austerity and privatization had weakened state regulatory capacity and hollowed out formerly state-owned oil, mining, and gas companies, forcing states to partner with foreign firms in order to realize extractive projects—and sharply limiting resource sovereignty.[50] Lastly, insofar as these states still courted foreign investment, they were forced to take "business confidence" into account, bowing to the demands of large companies to avoid capital strikes or capital flight.[51] In Ecuador, the power of investor leverage became apparent in June 2014, when under pressure from the mining multinational Kinross, the legislature approved reforms to the 2009 Mining Law that delayed the payment of the windfall profit tax until investment had been recouped and established a ceiling for royalty payments.[52] Despite these reforms, contract negotiations with Kinross fell through, and the perception that Ecuadorian mining law was overly "statist" continued to circulate in trade publications.[53] As a result, although there have been important changes in natural resource governance, the institutional legacy of neoliberal policymaking and the power of foreign investors exercises significant constraints on leftist governments.[54]

Continuities between the neoliberal and Pink Tide administrations are particularly salient at the immediate sites of extraction. Bureaucrats in the Correa administration developed a range of strategies to mitigate protest and promote resource extraction at the community level. One way to convince affected communities is with concrete economic benefits. In September 2011, Correa signed Executive Decree 870, which established state-owned enterprise Ecuador Estratégico for the purpose of "the redistribution of national wealth and to bring development to citizens through the execution of programs and projects to provide infrastructure, equipment and services to the areas in

whose territory nonrenewable natural resources are located" in order to "make these [directly affected] communities the first beneficiaries of oil, mining and natural wealth in general."[55] Another policy to fast-forward the local economic benefits of mining is "anticipated royalties." Royalties are usually paid once extraction begins, but the contract for the Mirador mine stipulates that Chinese mining conglomerate Ecuacorrientes S.A. (ECSA) pay a total of $100 million in royalties in advance of generating income. And, as per the 2009 Mining Law, 60 percent of royalties must be channeled to "productive projects and sustainable local development" via local governments."[56]

Although public regulation and investment can reduce and compensate for socio-environmental impacts, from the perspective of the communities directly affected by extractive projects, the increased involvement of state officials did not fundamentally alter the experience of an extractive model of accumulation and the forms of dispossession it entails.[57] Moreover, according to environmentalist and indigenous critics, such state interventions mimic the dissembling practices of "corporate social responsibility," designed by multinational firms in order to improve their corporate image (in the eyes of shareholders and consumers) and buffer their operations from local political resistance. In this sense, anticipated royalties and investment in affected communities represent more continuity than departure from the neoliberal era.[58]

Resource Radicalisms

While the ascendancy of new leftist governments may have unevenly transformed resource *policy*, it has fundamentally transformed the *politics* of extractive economies.[59]

Indigenous, campesino, environmental, and labor movements, among others that had protested against neoliberalism, paved the way for the electoral success of leftist parties. In the wake of electoral victories, these movements demanded a range of deeper initiatives to reorganize the relationship between state, society, economy, and nature—from wholesale nationalization to the construction of a post-extractive economy—that leftist governments have not implemented. From the perspective of these movements' activists, such reorganizations are vital to the project of decolonizing a continent in which the history of resource extraction is intimately tied to that of conquest and subjugation. In response to such demands, leftist governments in countries such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela have often reprimanded indigenous and environmental groups, framing them as obstacles to the national good of resource-funded development. Meanwhile, as the Ecuadorian

case reveals, these groups have struggled to organize an anti-extractive mass movement with the size and capacity of the earlier anti-neoliberal popular bloc—a point to which I return in the Conclusion.

What is the relationship between resource governance and the radical critique of it? In Ecuador, both neoliberal and nationalist policies have been unevenly implemented. But as ideologically inflected policy paradigms, they oriented state and corporate actors vis-à-vis resource sectors. They formed part of the political terrain that structured (and was structured by) the interactions between state actors and social movements. And these governance models were imbued with social meaning via the emic categories through which they were apprehended and analyzed—including those articulated by social movements.[60]

Much scholarship on protest around resource extraction sees social movements as responding either to state policies and ideologies, or to corporate strategies. But state policy, corporate strategy, and social movement resistance cannot be studied in isolation from one another. My analysis decenters state resource policy and the official ideologies that undergird it, and locates both in a field of political struggle populated by actors with contending visions of resource extraction. Among those visions are those I have called resource radicalisms, which are articulated by popular organizations and social movements, whether oil and mine workers' unions, urban neighborhood associations, environmental groups, or indigenous federations. Their members, militants, and activists are the architects of these radical critiques of prevailing models of extraction, critiques which not only guide social movement strategy—and, in moments of confrontation, elicit repressive responses from the state—but shape the terms and stakes of political conflict. As will be seen in the chapters that follow, state actors responded to new critiques of resource extraction by redeploying the terms of critique as justifications for extraction.[61]

Popular movements articulated the two resource radicalisms analyzed in this book—radical resource nationalism and anti-extractivism—in the course of struggles over economic development, resource extraction, territorial rights, and democratic sovereignty. These radicalisms map onto two different political periods (1990 to 2006, and 2007 to 2017, respectively), but not neatly or discretely: prior to their bifurcation as two distinct discourses, a nascent rejection of oil-led development coexisted alongside calls to nationalize oil resources. Popular movements consolidated and deployed these resource radicalisms in opposition to the prevailing paradigm of resource governance (neoliberalism and post-neoliberal resource nationalism). And in each period, activists' critiques and processes of resistance also shaped state practices. They

forced state actors to adopt new ideological justifications for their promotion of extraction, incited ideological disputes among bureaucrats, and slowed down the development of large-scale mining as well as new oil exploration.[62]

As a pair, the two epigraphs to this introduction reveal a historically dynamic field of debate over the governance of resource extraction, understood broadly as not only models of development but as forms of political rule. Both epigraphs bear the traces of prior conflicts, even as they adjust past radical visions and evince the unpredictable futures of political projects.

During what the social movement manifesto refers to as the "yesterday" of neoliberalism, the same organizations that now fought against extractivism had instead demanded the nationalization of resource extraction. They saw the nationalization of ownership as vital to the recuperation of national sovereignty and the redistribution of national wealth. This was a regional pattern: in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, and elsewhere, indigenous, campesino, trade union, and environmental organizations resisted the deregulation and privatization of resources such as oil, minerals, water, and natural gas.[63] These groups demanded various forms of popular control over resource extraction, ranging from nationalization to worker control to local management by the indigenous peoples whose territory overlapped with hydrocarbon reserves. The hegemony of neoliberal policies allowed for this provisional alignment of social movement organizations with such distinct political trajectories and positions on extraction. I call this formation *radical resource nationalism.* As Benjamin Kohl and Linda Farthing discuss in regard to the case of Bolivia, this popular resource imaginary is firmly "anti-imperialist and protonationalist."[64] It is also an emotionally charged appeal that is often "formed around grievances rather than potentialities and focus[ed] on demands to recoup what has been lost and continues to be lost through foreign-controlled extraction."[65]

In Ecuador, during that same period and alongside the crystallization of radical resource nationalism, another radical position on extraction was beginning to emerge. In the course of conflictual and sometimes violent encounters between oil companies and indigenous peoples of the Amazon, the latter articulated a militant defense of territory against oil exploration. The demands voiced by Sarayaku, Achuar, and Shuar leaders provided the discourses and shaped the political strategies that would be subsequently unified under the banner of anti-extractivism.

These intertwined critiques of extraction coexisted until the new political conjuncture of the late 2000s converted them into mutually opposed positions. In this new context—marked by Correa's inauguration (in 2007),

a Constituent Assembly (2007–2008) that rewrote the constitution, and the Correa government's avid promotion of large-scale mining (2009–2017)—the first position, radical resource nationalism, became an ideological resource for an administration seeking to take political and economic advantage of soaring global demand for primary commodities. But state actors reinterpreted nationalism as the *redistribution* of resource rents, rather than *expropriation* and national ownership. This was a nationalism amenable to courting foreign capital and deepening global market integration. In response, social movement activists and critical intellectuals abandoned their previous demands for nationalization, and reoriented their resistance to target what they now called the extractive model, amplifying the history of localized opposition to oil extraction in the Amazon into wholesale anti-extractivism. This model, they argued, pollutes the environment, violates collective rights, reinforces dependency on foreign capital, and undermines democracy. The gravity of the extractive model's political, economic, and environmental consequences is matched by the *longue durée* timescale of its domination: for anti-extractive activists, extractivism originated with European conquest and was only reproduced by the recent turn to post-neoliberal resource nationalism.

Although its elements had existed in inchoate form prior to Correa's rise to power, the reign of an avowedly post-neoliberal administration was the key historical condition for a mode of critique and resistance that zeroed in on resource extraction itself. Correa spoke of the nation, sovereignty, democracy, a "solidary" economy, equality, citizenship, participation, and, most importantly and poetically, of an end to the "long night of neoliberalism." He emphasized paying off the social debt accumulated under decades of austerity and economic crisis. Drawing on a long-established discursive repertoire of social resistance, he identified a cast of political and economic enemies: the international financial system, foreign corporations, domestic oligarchs, and corrupt political parties. In direct response to resounding popular demands, he called for a constituent assembly to refound the state. But in part because of these clear ideological signals, Correa found himself in heated political conflict with indigenous, campesino, environmental, labor, and feminist social movements. If even a self-identified leftist government could reproduce or, worse, intensify the rapacious exploitation of nature and the subordination of indigenous communities to a homogenously defined nation, in the process violating collective rights and centralizing power, then, social movement activists concluded, the root of the problem was not the ideological stripe of elected officials but the "civilizational" model that encompassed socialism and capitalism alike. The crystallization of this discourse in turn fomented a

dispute among the Left over whether emancipation lies in an alternative form *of* economic development, or in alternatives *to* the very concept of development, seen as historically rooted in relations of coloniality.[66]

The Material Practice of Situated Critique

This book traces a genealogy of the critique of extractivism, and analyzes how its crystallization inflected resource-related contention, constitutional interpretation, radical democracy, claims to knowledge and expertise, and the fraught construction of a post-neoliberal state. In doing so, I take an approach distinct from that of extant scholarship on extractivism—and, as I detail below, from the study of resource politics more broadly. Most scholarship on extractivism employs it as a descriptive or analytical term to refer to extractive activities, the policies and ideologies that promote them, their socio-environmental effects, and the forms of resistance that they provoke.[67] In contrast, this book analyzes extractivism as the central term that unifies an emic discourse articulated by situated actors reflecting on and critiquing historically specific models of resource governance. In other words, my analysis centers on the collective agency of grassroots activists who, through their intertwined activities of critique and mobilization, shape the terms and stakes of resource politics. For this reason, when referring to this discourse as a whole, I use the Spanish *extractivismo*.[68]

I take methodological inspiration from Michel Foucault's archaeological and genealogical approaches: "I do not question discourses about their silently intended meanings, but about the fact and the conditions of their manifest appearance; not about the contents which they may conceal, but about the transformations which they have effected; not about the sense preserved within them like a perpetual origin, but about the field where they coexist, reside and disappear."[69]

Here, I identify the conditions of appearance of *extractivismo* discourse.[70] Under what conditions did social movement activists and intellectuals begin to critique "the extractive model"? What were the political and intellectual sources of this critique, and what were the historic conditions of its crystallization? What were its regularities, its variations, and its pragmatic political effects? My analytic perspective historicizes this critical discourse, and regards social movement activists and intellectuals as protagonists in crafting its conceptual architecture. This mode of analysis does not regard discourse as ontologically distinct from or epiphenomenal of "reality," but rather takes discourse to be the linguistic mediation of

social relations and the concrete medium through which we reflect upon, make, and remake our social worlds.

Critique is a genre of discourse that endeavors to reveal the root causes and systemic nature of its object. In the case of the movements analyzed in this book, and radical politics more broadly, the practice of critique also opens up the possibility of—and the demand for—a world otherwise. Radical resource nationalism imagines a world of popular and democratic control over oil and minerals. Anti-extractivism, in contrast, aspires to a post-extractive future characterized by a harmonious relationship between humans and nature.

Critique is a form of creativity facilitated by the reflexive capacity of semiosis. As Andreas Glaeser writes, semiotic activity, and language particularly, "enable[s] human beings to escape the strictures of the immediate context of action."[71] Through symbols, "the world can be differentiated and integrated in the lofty modality of the 'as-if.'"[72]

The creative capacity of discourse is to an extent bounded: in order to take hold in and potentially transform a particular social context, critiques must resonate with the existing understandings of the world relevant to that social domain. For this reason, creativity often takes the form of the recombination of existing elements or the redeployment of available repertoires to ends not previously envisioned.[73] Radical resource nationalism echoed the developmentalist resource nationalism associated with the Rodríguez Lara military government. Anti-extractive movements, meanwhile, drew on the grievances and demands of southeastern Amazonian indigenous communities, which formed the basis for a wholesale rejection of extraction in all forms.

Critiques exist in complex relations with broader processes of resistance. They present grievances and demands, define shared identities, select targets, inform tactics, mediate alliances, and constitute a key element of the rich symbolism that accompanies acts of protest. They are in turn shaped by the exigencies and events of mobilization. As I show in the chapters that follow, under the rubric of anti-extractivism, a multi-scalar alliance of indigenous and environmental movements enacted new forms of democratic participation, organized outings to the territories slated for extraction, produced their own knowledge regarding socio-environmental impacts, brought cases to the Constitutional Court, and physically blockaded attempts to develop mining or oil projects. The systemic object of their critique was immanent in the spatial contours of their resistance. Traversing mountains, wetlands, and rainforest, they mobilized a network of directly affected communities along the frontiers of extraction, confronting the extractive model at the roots of what they saw as its expansionary imperative.

The conditions of critique are *historically specific* and *sociologically asymmetric*: specific historical junctures and social resources facilitate the emergence and consolidation of critique.[74] In Ecuador, the proximate historical conditions of new resource radicalisms were transformations in the ideological orientation of resource policy coinciding with broader disputes over the political-economic model.[75] In response to state actors' embrace of neoliberalism, social movements coalesced around a radical resource nationalism; a decade later, with the rise of a leftist populist administration that sought to channel the economic benefits of extraction to the majority, these movements rallied under the banner of anti-extractivism.

Battling state institutions and domestic and foreign firms, those involved in labor unions, indigenous, campesino, and urban neighborhood organizations, and environmental groups found themselves on an uneven field of engagement, marked by an unequal distribution of institutional and financial resources. In the neoliberal era, state and economic elites crafted a shared vision of a "multicultural market democracy" that formally incorporated indigenous peoples and other marginalized groups while excluding more radical demands from the political agenda.[76] Subsequently, in post-neoliberal Ecuador, the diffusion of technocratic discourses through networks that encompassed both state and corporate actors facilitated elite coordination, resulting in shared strategies for responding to, and repressing, anti-extractive resistance.

Yet despite the unequal distribution of the means of discursive production and dissemination, activists did have access to their own communicational infrastructure.[77] This infrastructure was comprised of social movement organizations' physical headquarters and e-mail listservs, social media and blogs, event spaces at universities and cultural centers, informal venues for gathering and conversation, and—especially during public demonstrations—streets, highways, and plazas. During the two-week long March for Water, Life, and the Dignity of Peoples, discussed in several of the following chapters, the daily output of the blog maintained by the highland indigenous federation Ecuarunari contributed to the production of a shared narrative about the march among both participants and supporters. The production and dissemination of the blog exemplified the imbrication of online and offline political activity, as well as the materiality of discursive production. Blog posts were produced in the heat of political practice, whenever the communications team could find an internet café or a Wi-Fi connection. It was a collaborative effort. The Ecuarunari communications team was part of the march and built their reports via face-to-face communication with march participants, as well as by attending press conferences. The posts were then collectively authored by the blog team,

with others (including myself) providing editorial or translation assistance. Once posted and disseminated via e-mail and social media, at the next opportunity to access the internet, we marchers would subsequently read them and incorporate them into the ongoing, reflexive construction of a shared narrative about our own political activity. This process strengthened marchers' political resolve and provided a counter-narrative to the claims of state actors (for example, that the march was ineffective, a result of political manipulation, or an attempt to overthrow the government).

In contrast to political scientists' tendency to regard discourse as ideational or as disembodied meanings floating in the ether, the discursively mediated interactions I observed in closed meetings, public events, and protests, elicited in interviews, read in texts, or heard on radio or television broadcast were material acts. They consisted of "vibrating columns of air, ink on paper, pixels in electronic media."[78] It is the very materiality of linguistic communication (and of semiosis more broadly) that allows discourse to function as a mediator of social relations. The materiality of individual discursive artifacts spatiotemporally limits them, circumscribing their circulation and reception. But materiality is also what enables the reinterpretation, reanimation, and reappropriation of discursive artifacts: "burning documents turns on paper's combustibility, using paper as a toy airplane turns on its foldability, storing it turns on its perdurability."[79] Materiality can thus be conceived as "a *relationship* across events of semiosis."[80]

The understandings of the world communicated through language therefore exist in determinate relations with the material conditions of social life.[81] Although ideas are only thinkable and speakable within historically specific regimes of discourse or ideological problematics, they are not epiphenomenal or symptomatic reflections of an underlying reality.[82] Language shapes the world, whether through its performative function or as a medium of political justification and critique, governance, and resistance.[83]

The ongoing communicative acts that comprise radical critiques of prevailing economic models unfold on the plane of material relations and they can only be understood as articulated and deployed in concrete political struggles with adversaries. As the epigraphs suggest, in Ecuador the conflict over resource extraction took place on a terrain shaped by past struggles over resources and territory, and in the midst of a dispute over the content of leftism. The conflict over resource extraction was structured by the unequal relations between actors and unified by the problematic of *extractivismo*.[84] This problematic was the shared ground against which distinct positions were brought into relief and without which they would be mutually unintelligible.[85] At the same

time, the conflict was also characterized by innovation, unexpected outcomes, and reversals of position. Although from the perspective of any given actor the terrain was given or "objective" in the sense that it was "largely not of their own choosing," the dynamics of conflict kept the terrain in motion.[86] Conceiving of this conflict as a field of social action—a relationally defined terrain of struggle—captures this dual nature.[87]

The Double-Edge of Critique

The dynamic, conflictual, and asymmetric nature of this social field, combined with the material infrastructure of communicative activity, results in the unexpected redeployment and resignification of the discourses of one's opponents.[88] The very same communicational infrastructure that enables discourse to travel beyond its initial moments of production and generate macropolitical effects also makes it available for subsequent reanimation—as well as more strategic reappropriation by those with competing political projects.[89] Because discourses can potentially travel beyond their intended audiences, they can be redeployed for purposes other than those imagined by their authors.[90] Discourses have unpredictable and unexpected futures ahead of them. Reanimations and reappropriations of discourse are key to understanding the dynamics of conflict.

In Chapter 3, I show that indigenous activists reanimated arguments made by allied delegates during the Constituent Assembly that drafted the constitutional text. After the Constitution was ratified, they drew on those arguments to advocate for more radical provisions than the text itself contained. They reanimated proposals that had failed on the plenary floor—for example, a proposal to require the consent of affected communities prior to extractive projects—to craft an interpretation of the Constitution that exceeded its literal content. More politically strategic reappropriations by one's opponents can elicit frustration on the part of situated actors.[91] As suggested by the epigraph, for social movement activists, state actors' use of terms like *buen vivir* and post-extractivism is a form of "double discourse," proclaiming a commitment to a different model of development while, from the perspective of those activists, perpetuating extractivism.

Such instances of reanimation and reappropriation underline the fact that political discourse is always already collectively authored. Any attempt to stabilize social meanings comes up against the others who have spoken and will speak those same words, but to different ends and with different consequences: "That is what reclaimed words do—they retain, they insist on retaining, a sense

of the fugitive."[92] Or, as Mikhail Bakhtin put it, "The word in language is half someone else's . . . Language is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of the speaker's intentions; it is populated—overpopulated—with the intentions of others."[93]

Words arrive already overpopulated with meanings. No actor can control in advance what meanings will be crowded into their words or what political projects their words will be used to support.

The Temporality of Critique

The potential for reanimation and reappropriation of discourse is in turn grounded in the complex temporality of critique. Although activists articulated and deployed resource radicalisms in a mutually constitutive relationship with the model of resource governance that they critiqued, these critical discourses evinced a historicity distinct from the chronology of governance. First, there was a lag between the shift in governance and the mobilization against it. Although in Ecuador the transition to a neoliberal governance model began in 1980, the critique of this model—radical resource nationalism—prevailed from roughly 1990 to 2006. Meanwhile, although the shift away from the neoliberal model commenced with Correa's inauguration in 2007, the shift to an anti-extractivist position among social movements crystallized over the course of the next three years. This is in part because social movements need time to respond to the changing political terrain, which itself is not instantly transformed but gradually remade as new policies are implemented, and in part because critical discourses developed in prior moments may continue to circulate even when the circumstances for and in which they were developed have changed.[94]

Second, in addition to the lag, these critical discourses redeployed (and in the process, resignified) political demands articulated at earlier points in history. Radical resource nationalism encompassed both a statist nationalism that can be traced to the early 1970s (when it was briefly the policy orientation of the nationalist military dictatorship that inaugurated Ecuador as a "petrostate") and the ongoing struggle for the recognition of indigenous territory, which grew out of a longer history of peasant organizing and appeared on the national political stage in the form of a unified indigenous movement in 1990. Although these two ideological strains rested on different understandings of the connection between nation, state, territory, and resources, they could coexist in the discourse of a given organization or individual activist because they both constituted critiques of neoliberal resource governance. One framed

this governance model as an incarnation of capitalism, the other as an incarnation of (neo)colonialism. During the mid-1990s through the early 2000s, indigenous and environmental activists began to call for an end to oil extraction in the Amazon, broadening the demand for the recognition of indigenous territory into a critique of extractive activity. The narrative of neoliberalism and the radical resource nationalism it provoked built up to a critical juncture in the context of which the preexisting elements of *extractivismo* discourse could coalesce into a novel problematic.

For both these reasons—temporal lag and the (re)combination of preexisting elements—the historicity of radical critique is distinct from that of governance in ways that complicate preconceived periods and their imputed unity. Tracing the unique temporality of critique thus offers an alternative narrative logic to historical accounts organized around the ideological orientations of policymaking elites.

In addition to its distinct logic of periodization, the narrative that follows evinces the double temporality identified by Walter Benjamin in his philosophy of history: the present looks backward at the past looking forward toward the present.[95] Written in the present, my genealogy of *extractivismo* is inevitably refracted by the contemporary structure of political conflict. It looks back in time in search of this critique's source discourses, which are resignified elements dating to prior moments of contention, and injects activists' prior statements with the "presence of the now."[96] But, as much as is possible, I will elucidate the perspectives of the past on their own terms, as concrete responses to prevailing conditions that also always exceeded those conditions, pointing to a hoped for emancipatory future.

Reorienting the Study of Extractive Politics

The commodity boom of 2000 to 2014 and the related repoliticization of resource extraction in Latin America sparked a renewal of scholarly interest in the contentious politics of oil and mining.[97] Joining this scholarship, I present a distinct perspective on the relationship between resource governance and anti-extractive protest. I uncover ideological battles within and between state ministries, recount the diffusion of critiques and justifications across the borders of officialdom and resistance, and reveal society to be the historically conditioned assembly of collective subjectivities, with shifting ascriptions of interests and identity. In contrast to predominant approaches, I reject the dualistic image of the state as a monolithic dispenser of public policy, and of resistance as an external force, quasi-organically emanating

from society. Instead, I analyze resource politics as an expansive and vibrant field of contention.

The concept of the "resource curse"—the detrimental effect of natural resource wealth on development and democracy—dominates political science literature and public policy discourse on oil (and, to a lesser extent, on mining).[98] In this literature, the state is ambivalent: it is the powerful dispenser of oil policy and distributor of oil rents and at the same time it is the product of oil dependency, unable to resist the easy rents oil abundance provides or the political-economic pathologies it guarantees.[99] Meanwhile, society is portrayed as either bought off by oil money or repressed into submission.

Tying this conceptual framework together is an analytic focus on the allocation and distribution of oil rents. In this framework, fiscal dependency on resource extraction functions as a causal force that shapes regime type or economic development, often operating via the causal mechanism of incentive structures (specifically, the effect of resource rents on the governance and investment strategies of elite actors). This approach necessarily assumes that "natural resources"—or, more precisely, the revenue streams they generate—are homogeneously deterministic and that politics is primarily an elite affair, wherein oil money facilitates rentierism, oligarchic pacts, clientelism, and state repression. The threat to democracy is seen to emanate from rentier states' ability to minimize direct taxation of the population (relying instead on taxes on oil companies and royalties from oil sales), which provides a buffer against citizens' demands for representation.

Other scholarship takes a more nuanced approach, emphasizing that the political effects of resource rents are not unmediated but highly contingent on the relative timing of oil or mineral discovery vis-à-vis the process of state formation or the ownership structure of oil firms.[100] As Benjamin Smith puts it, oil rents constitute a "highly flexible form of revenue" that, depending on features of the political and economic context, can either bolster regime durability or foment political instability.[101] In this vein, and contra the thesis that "oil hinders democracy," Thad Dunning argues that commodity booms can under certain conditions promote democratization. In the Latin American context, wherein the primary threat to democracy has been elites' fear of popular power, oil rents can satisfy popular demands without requiring the redistribution or expropriation of property, thus stabilizing democracy against the threat of elite-organized coups.[102]

What these approaches have in common is a shared focus on the state-centric distributional politics of resource dependency within "rentier states." But, as Timothy Mitchell puts it, all states are "oil states," in the sense that

modern industrialized democracies are themselves thoroughly imbricated in the production, distribution, and consumption of oil flows.[103] Further, depending on features of the historical conjuncture, the relationship between the highly compressed forms of energy made available by coal and later oil have both enabled and limited democracy. Technologies of extraction and distribution, the domestic and geopolitical problems confronting political and economic elites, and the organization of labor all shape the political consequences of hydrocarbon resources.[104] In Ecuador, far from undermining democracy, contention around oil extraction and the construction of a large-scale mining sector occasioned novel democratic practices. In the dispute over large-scale mining, both anti-extractive activists and the Correa administration saw the expansion of resource extraction as raising fundamental questions about the practice of democratic sovereignty, and both articulated figures of "the people" and enacted new modes of participation to defend their political positions.

This book joins work in anthropology, political ecology, and geography that takes a broader view of the politics of resource extraction than the elite-centric perspectives of the rentier state and resource curse frameworks.[105] I show that indigenous, labor, campesino, and radical environmental activists did not merely react to the top-down imposition of resource policy. They were central protagonists in the articulation of resource imaginaries and the construction of natural resources as a site of radical politics. They articulated these imaginaries in dynamic relation with state actors: in addition to responding to state policy, they shaped state action, both by provoking new modes of official justification and intervention, and by exacerbating ideological fractures within the state. I demonstrate that leftist presidents in Latin America have contended with resistance from inside and outside their administrations, and that the outcomes of these conflicts shape the possibilities for domestic policymaking and social mobilization. As a corollary, I reject the dichotomy of "good" leftist governments (for example, Chile, Brazil, Uruguay) versus "bad" ones (for example, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela), which, in order to array countries in a normative hierarchy, both decontextualizes governments from the broader political field of leftist forces and constructs them as monolithic entities.[106]

My analytic orientation, which regards resource extraction as a historically dynamic field of conflict, is reflected in my methodological approach. Empirically, this book traces the discourses and the political strategies they shape (and are shaped by) across the boundaries of state and society, within the myriad institutional and organizational locations that constitute each. Between

2010 and 2016, I conducted fifteen months of multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork and archival research. My time was primarily split between Quito, the capital (and Ecuador's second-largest city) and site of central government institutions, social movement headquarters, NGO and corporate offices, and major universities; Cuenca (Ecuador's third-largest city) and surrounding rural communities in the southern highland province of Azuay, home to several planned gold-mining projects; and Zamora Chinchipe, a southern Amazonian province that is the site of a large-scale, open-pit copper mine, and a planned underground gold mine.

In the course of my research, I conducted over 100 interviews with bureaucrats in the Correa administration, opposition politicians, corporate representatives, public intellectuals, professors, NGO personnel, and social movement activists in indigenous, environmental, human rights, student, and labor union organizations. I also observed events as they unfolded, such as: protests (including the two-week long March for Water, Life, and the Dignity of Peoples, which covered 700 kilometers), activist meetings, mining and oil conventions co-organized by private firms and state institutions, NGO-coordinated "dialogues" on resource conflict, a day-long community consultation on a mining project, public fora on mining (usually, but not always, organized by anti-extractive activists), press conferences organized by the national indigenous federation, popular assemblies, community-organized walks (*caminatas*) through mining concessions, court cases litigating the rights of nature, radical reading groups, and community meetings in indigenous territory. Lastly, I conducted archival research at the Library of the National Assembly (specifically the documentation of the 2007–2008 Constituent Assembly meetings, debates, and resolutions, and the Interim Congress debates over the 2009 Mining Law) and using the extensive collection of daily press coverage of indigenous issues curated by the annual publication *Kipu* (published between 1985 and 2014).

Each of these three categories of data—interview, event, archive—provided distinct vantage points on the social processes under analysis. Observing events unfold in real time gave me insights into the granular dynamics of the discursive activity that mediates political practice—and into the interplay between the contingency of strategic decisions and the structured organizational contexts of their articulation.[107] Such seemingly "micro" interactions always draw upon available discursive formations, political ideologies, and institutionalized sources of political and economic power, as well as social status. They are also situated in an asymmetric terrain of political conflict comprising differentially situated allies and opponents. And such interactions can be carried forward in

time and outward in space via subsequent interactions, whether face-to-face or textually mediated, in the form of uptake, circulation, reanimation, documentation, dissemination, and storage. Through these socio-technical means of circulation, a given interaction can live a social life beyond its initial context of unfolding and entail consequences of a "macro" political nature. Thus, whether or not an interaction generates enduring effects cannot be determined in advance. Just as events have unpredictable futures, so too do they index pasts both distant and proximate. In this way, real-time observation, the elicitation of individual and collective memory, and the interpretation of archived documentation can be analytically interwoven to approximate the multiplex temporality of social life.

Overview of the Book

This temporally and spatially interwoven nature of my data and of the social processes upon which they offer a vantage point is reflected in the organization of the chapters that follow.

The first two chapters provide a genealogy of the critical discourse of *extractivismo*, and identify the political conditions—and consequences—of its crystallization. Chapter 1 covers a long historical arc, tracing the shift from radical resource nationalism to the critical discourse of *extractivismo*. It threads together three processes: first, the eruption of localized struggles over resources, land, and indigenous territory (from the 1930s to the 1980s); second, the development of state policy regarding the extraction and export of natural resources (1972 to 2017); and third, the articulation of resource radicalisms that critiqued those policies and envisioned alternatives (1990 to 2017).

Chapter 2 demonstrates that the crystallization of the problematic of *extractivismo* triggered a political realignment: activists that once fought for the nationalization of natural resources now opposed all resource extraction, a leftist president found himself in conflict with the social movements who initially supported his political project, and the Left-in-power became synonymous with the expansion of extraction at any cost. In response, President Correa and high-ranking ministers claimed that opposition to oil and mineral extraction was a tactic of imperial powers acting under the guise of environmentalism. The redeployment of anti-imperialist critique highlights the degree to which this was a fight within the Left. Meanwhile, functionaries I call "critical bureaucrats" critiqued resource extraction from inside the state. Articulating a discourse that resonated with that of anti-extractive activists, they sought to

both slow down the pace of extraction and to transition to a post-extractive economic model.

The next three chapters follow the dispute over resource extraction as it reverberated through conflicts over the interpretation of the Constitution, the meaning of democracy, and the grounds of epistemic authority. Chapter 3 focuses on the politics surrounding the writing of the 2008 Constitution. This multivalent text empowers both the state and local communities with authority over resource extraction. It calls for a new model of public policy, *buen vivir* (living well), and is the first constitution in the world to recognize nature as a subject of rights. As I show, from the 2007–2008 Constituent Assembly to long after the text was ratified, the Constitution lived through the semiotic activity that cites, circulates, and interprets it. Its normative force and political salience was the product of this multi-sited interpretive process, wherein social movement activists' practices of popular jurisprudence played a particularly important role.

Chapter 4 zooms in on a particularly contentious constitutional right: prior consultation (*consulta previa*), the collective right of communities to be consulted prior to extractive projects. On October 2, 2011, two rural water systems in the southern highland province of Azuay decided to take constitutional enforcement into their own hands. They organized a consultation to enforce their constitutionally mandated right to be consulted prior to the development of a nearby large-scale mine—a right they claimed that public institutions failed to guarantee. The consultation occasioned a dispute over the collective subject of democratic authority. By shifting the struggle over extraction into the terms of democracy, this new form of social mobilization forced state actors to respond. The latter elaborated a vision of *extractive democracy* that justified the expansion of large-scale mining in democratic terms, shored up by new policies of targeted local and national investment that redistributed resource rents.

Chapter 5 reveals how bureaucrats in this leftist administration perceived and attempted to manage anti-extractive resistance. Bureaucrats and industry actors seeking to promote large-scale mining regarded what they call "information" as a panacea for anti-mining conflict. In their discourse, communities oppose mining because they are "misinformed." This discourse resonated with Correa's technocratic vision, which claimed that mining is a "technical" and not a "political" issue. But technocratic discourse failed to depoliticize mining. Instead, officials' claims to technical expertise became politicized, fomenting divisions among state actors. Meanwhile, anti-mining activists challenged the epistemic authority of bureaucrats and mining corporations. They produced

counter-knowledge that figures *el territorio* (territory) as an ecological and cultural landscape.

Finally, in the Conclusion I chart the dilemmas and contradictions of resource dependency for both the Left-in-power and the Left-in-resistance, and draw out the implications for resource politics and leftist mobilization in the years and decades to come. I reflect on the tension between *extractivismo* as critique and its generative capacity to construct the conditions of effective collective action in a political context in which socialism—and the form of mass politics it names—and radical environmentalism became decoupled and mutually counterposed as political projects.

Introduction: Resource Radicalisms

Epigraph: In this context, peoples (*los pueblos*) refers to indigenous peoples.

1 "Manifiesto del encuentro de movimentos sociales del Ecuador por la democracia y la vida," August 9, 2011 (http://www.inesc.org.br/noticias-es/2011/agosto/manifiesto-del-encuentro-de-movimentos-sociales-del-ecuador-por-la-democracia-y-la-vida).

2 Activists and allied public intellectuals use this term interchangeably with "the extractive model." For definitions, see Albuja and Dávalos, "Extractivismo y posneoliberalismo, 89–98; Chavez, "El estado del debate sobre desarrollo, extractivismo, y acumulación en el Ecuador," 10; Gudynas, "Diez tesis urgentes sobre el nuevo extractivismo," 188; Svampa, *Debates latinoamericanos*, 372.

3 Francisca Cabieses Martinez, "Revolución ciudadana, el camino del Ecuador," *Punto Final*, May 25, 2012 (http://www.puntofinal.cl/758/rafael758.php).

4 Correa, "Ecuador's Path."

5 For paradigmatic examples, see Karl, *The Paradox of Plenty*; Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" and *The Oil Curse*; and Weyland, "The Rise of Latin America's Two Lefts." For the earlier rentier state literature that the resource curse concept draws upon, see Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World"; Mahdavy, "The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States."

6 For the phrase "rentier mentality," see Beblawi, "Rentier State."

7 As Michael Watts argues, the notion that primary commodities, abstracted from social relations, possess special economic or political powers is a form of "commodity determinism" (Watts, "Righteous Oil?"). See also, Huber, *Lifeblood,* 116.

8 For the proliferation of resource-related conflict in a warming world, see Parenti, *Tropic of Chaos* and Welzer, *Climate Wars.*

9 Bebbington et al., "Political Settlements and the Governance of Extractive Industry," 6–8; Bridge, "Contested Terrain"; Bridge and Le Billon, *Oil*, esp. 40–76; Perreault, "Political Contradictions of Extractive Development."

10 Bebbington et al., "Political Settlements," 6.

11 For the term "Global South," see Garland Mahler, "What/Where Is the Global South?" (https://globalsouthstudies.as.virginia.edu/what-is-global-south, accessed December 8, 2018). As she writes, while the term originated as a "post-cold war alternative to 'Third World' . . . in recent years and within a variety of fields, the Global South is employed in a post-national sense to address spaces and peoples negatively impacted by contemporary capitalist globalization." While the countries to which I refer to here are located within the term's earlier, and narrower,

geographic contours, I concur with the post-national expansion of the concept, as it better captures the territorial pattern of uneven capitalist development (and accords with the fractal structure of core/periphery and satellite/metropole in world systems theory).

12 Karl, *Paradox of Plenty*; Smith, *Hard Times in the Lands of Plenty*.

13 Bebbington et al., "Political Settlements," 8–10, 16; Kohl and Farthing, "Material Constraints to Popular Imaginaries"; Perreault and Valdivia, "Hydrocarbons, Protest, and National Imaginaries."

14 For seminal analyses of this relationship, see Frank, *Lumpen-Bourgeoisie and Lumpen-Development*; Prebisch, "Crecimiento Desequilibrio y Disparidades." For the notion of unequal ecological exchange, see Ciplet and Roberts, "Splintering the South." For an excellent overview of classical dependency theory, as well as its recent reformulations in the context of the Pink Tide, see Svampa, *Debates latinoamericanos*, Part I, Chapter 2 and Part II, Chapter 2.

15 Dependency theorists use the term "underdevelopment" to describe the result of the incorporation of Latin American countries into global capitalism, first through imperial conquest and then through forms of neo-colonialism. The extraction of raw materials and the exploitation of enslaved (and otherwise extra-economically coerced) labor produced "development" for the core capitalist powers and "underdevelopment" for the periphery. Thus these theorists refute the notion that Latin America or other countries in the Global South are simply "undeveloped" or "backward"; rather, the Global North (in collusion with domestic elites) has actively "underdeveloped" the periphery via relations of domination and the extraction of surplus value. See Frank, *Lumpen-Bourgeoisie*; Stern, "Feudalism, Capitalism, and the World-System in the Perspective of Latin America and the Caribbean." For a definition of developmentalism, see the contributions to Woo-Cumings, *The Developmental State*.

16 Escobar, "Latin America at a Crossroads," 1.

17 Levitsky and Roberts, "Introduction: Latin America's 'Left Turn,'" 1.

18 For the term "decolonial," see Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity*.

19 The term *ecológismo popular* was developed by Joan Martínez Alier, and refers to territorialized conflicts that arise in response to the detrimental socio-environmental effects of economic growth; these effects threaten local means of subsistence and thus provoke social conflict. The actors that mobilize in such conflicts may or may not explicitly invoke environmental discourse. See Martínez Alier, "El ecologismo popular"; Latorre, "El ecologismo popular en el Ecuador."

20 The concept circulates in scholarly work (e.g., Svampa, "Commodities Consensus"; Webber, "Revolution against 'Progress'"; Veltmeyer and Petras, *The New Extractivism*), and in more popular genres (e.g., Klein, *This Changes Everything*). For further analysis of Ecuador as a particularly emblematic case of contention over extraction, see Escobar, "Latin America at a Crossroads"; Svampa, "Commodities Consensus."

21 In Latin American scholarship and in everyday political discourse, the phrase "popular sectors" (*sectores populares*) refers to the set of social groups who have

historically been exploited or excluded, whether due to their class, race, or ethnicity (or, more commonly, some combination thereof): peasant, working class, rural and urban poor, indigenous, and Afro-descendent.

22 Perreault, "Tendencies in Tension," 19.

23 These paradigms center on the governance of oil and, more recently, large-scale mining. Ecuador has also historically depended on the export of primary agricultural resources and other food commodities: cacao, banana, shrimp, and cut flowers. See Larrea and North, "Ecuador," 915–21; Latorre, Farrell, and Martínez-Alier, "The Commodification of Nature and Socio-Environmental Resistance in Ecuador."

24 There is a large scholarship on the causes of the Pink Tide. Specific case studies are cited elsewhere in this introduction and in the chapters that follow. This paragraph, which focuses on region-wide causes of the electoral shift to the Left, draws on the work of Arditi, "Arguments about the Left Turns in Latin America"; Cameron, "Latin America's Left Turns"; Levitsky and Roberts, "Latin America's 'Left Turn'"; Silva, *Challenging Neoliberalism in Latin America*.

25 On the commodity boom, see CEPAL, *Panorama de la inserción internacional de América Latina y el Caribe*; Cypher, "South America's Commodities Boom"; Cypher and Wilson, "China and Latin America"; Ruiz Acosta and Iturralde, *La alquimía de la riqueza*; Sinnot, Nash, and de la Torre, *Natural Resources in Latin America and the Caribbean*.

26 Perreault, "Tendencies in Tension," 19.

27 Perreault, "Tendencies in Tension," 19.

28 In addition, the law outlined plans (eventually realized by the Rodríguez Lara government) for a national oil company, Corporación Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana (CEPE), later renamed Petroecuador. See Martz, *Politics and Petroleum in Ecuador*, 55–61.

29 Garavini, "Completing Decolonization," 479.

30 Garavini, "Completing Decolonization," 478–83.

31 Prices spiked in 1973 when the Arab–Israeli War disrupted Middle East supplies and OPEC decided to increase the price per barrel (Martz, *Politics and Petroleum*, 116). See the following for historical accounts of nationalist oil policies among Third World countries during this time period: Dietrich, *Oil Revolution*; Garavini, "Completing Decolonization."

32 Martz, *Politics and Petroleum*, 103–13.

33 These policies, and their limitations, are discussed at more length in Chapter 1.

34 Conaghan, Malloy, and Abugattas, "Business and the 'Boys,'" 6–7; Hey and Klak, "From Protectionism to Neoliberalism"; Martz, *Politics and Petroleum*, 105–6, 125–7; Sawyer, *Crude Chronicles*, Chapters 3, 4.

35 Specifically, Ecuador's five principal exports (oil, bananas, shrimp, flowers, prepared/canned fish) accounted for on average 74.8 percent of total exports (Ruiz Acosta and Iturralde, *La alquimía de la riqueza*, 29).

36 Banco Central del Ecuador, "Información estadística mensual," December 2012; Banco Central del Ecuador, "Información estadística mensual," April 2014.

37 Gallagher, Irwin, and Koleski, "New Banks in Town," 6–10; Joshua Schneyer and Nicolas Medina Mora Perez, "Special Report: How China took control of an OPEC country's oil," *Reuters*, November 26, 2013 (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-ecuador-oil-special-report/special-report-how-china-took-control-of-an-opec-countrys-oil-idUSBRE9AP0HX20131126).

38 Petroecuador was founded in 1989 and is the successor to CEPE. For this figure, see the China-Latin America Finance Database (http://www.thedialogue.org/map_list/).

39 For attempts to construct a large-scale mining sector in Ecuador, and the resistance they occasioned, see the following accounts of the plans to develop the Junín Mine in the Intag Valley: Bebbington et al., "The Glocalization of Environmental Governance"; Cisneros, *¿Cómo se construye la sustentabilidad ambiental?*; Kuecker, "Fighting for the Forests Revisited"; Carlos Zorrilla, "The Struggle to Save Intag's Forests and Communities from Mitsubishi," June 21, 1999 (http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/41/103.html).

40 Berrios, Marak, and Morgenstern, "Explaining Hydrocarbon Nationalization in Latin America"; Haslam and Heidrich, "From Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism." Although my focus here is on leftist governments, Berrios, Marak, and Morgenstern show that during the boom, center and right-of-center governments have also increased the regulation of extractive sectors and the state "take" in terms of taxes and royalties.

41 Berrios, Marak, and Morgenstern, "Explaining Hydrocarbon Nationalization"; Haslam and Heidrich, "From Neoliberalism to Resource Nationalism"; Kaup, "A Neoliberal Nationalization?"; Kohl and Farthing, "Material Constraints."

42 As discussed in more depth in Chapter 1, in 2006, under pressure from protests, the Palacio administration terminated the contract with Occidental Petroleum for contract violations, but this was not a nationalization (despite how it has sometimes been portrayed in the literature and news reports). For changes to oil contract model, see Ghandi and Lin, "Oil and Gas Service Contracts around the World"; Mateo and García, "El sector petrolero en Ecuador, 2000–2010."

43 Poverty declined from 37 percent to 23 percent. Income inequality, measured by the Gini coefficient, declined from 0.55 to 0.47. See Larrea and Greene, "De la lucha contra la probreza a la superación de la codicia"; Ordóñez et al., "Sharing the Fruits of Progress"; Weisbrot, Johnston, and Merling, "Decade of Reform."

44 Amarante and Brun, "Cash Transfers in Latin America." See also CEPAL, "Base de datos de programas de protección social no contributiva" (https://dds.cepal.org/bpsnc/ptc, accessed January 7, 2019).

45 Amarante and Brun, "Cash Transfers."

46 Larrea and Greene, "De la lucha contra la probreza a la superación de la codicia"; Iturralde, *El negocio invisible de la salud*; Ponce and Vos, "Redistribution without Structural Change in Ecuador." It is worth noting that Ponce and Vos show that a significant portion of the reduction in income inequality was due to the recovery from the 1998–1999 economic crisis, but that this positive effect was amplified by the Correa administration's economic and fiscal policies.

47 Author's calculation based on the data provided in CEPAL, "Base de datos."
48 Ponce and Vos, "Redistribution without Structural Change."
49 I return to the topic of political retreat in the Conclusion.
50 For an in-depth analysis of this dynamic in Bolivia, see Kaup, "A Neoliberal Nationalization?"
51 For a helpful explanation of the various direct and indirect pressures investors exert on the state, see Block, "The Ruling Class Does Not Rule."
52 "Ecuador Pushing Ahead with Reforms to Lure Mining Investors," *Reuters*, May 6, 2013 (http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-16/news/sns-rt-ecuador-miningl2n0dx2h8-20130516_1_mining-law-mining-bill-mining-industry).
53 "Canadian Gold Giant Kinross Pulls Out of Ecuador Mine Project, Will China Take Its Place?" *International Business Times*, June 6, 2013 (http://www.ibtimes.com/canadian-gold-giant-kinross-pulls-out-ecuador-mine-project-will-china-take-its-place-1305761).
54 As discussed in Chapter 5, these continuities with neoliberalism were also evident at the level of ideology, especially bureaucrats' and corporate actors' emphasis on technocratic solutions to political problems.
55 Rafael Correa Delgado, Decreto ejecutivo n. 870, September 5, 2011.
56 Asamblea Nacional, Ley de Minería, art. 89.
57 Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, 159–65; Latorre, Farrell, and Martínez-Alier, "Commodification of Nature."
58 Cisneros, "Corporate Social Responsibility and Mining Policy in Ecuador."
59 Hogenboom, "Depoliticized and Repoliticized Minerals in Latin America," 151–2.
60 By "emic," I refer to the contextually specific discursive categories employed by the actors situated in the conflict under study, and through which they understand and ascribe meaning to their social world.
61 For a similar analysis of the relationship between critique and justification, see Boltanski and Chiapello, *The New Spirit of Capitalism.*
62 For example, as described in Chapters 2 and 5, the Correa administration embraced a variant of resource nationalism that was devoid of much of its radical content (for example, no nationalizations or expropriations) and ideologically repurposed it to delegitimize anti-extractive resistance and promote extraction at all cost.
63 Kohl and Farthing, "Material Constraints"; Gledhill, "The Persistent Imaginary of 'the People's Oil'"; Nem Singh, "Who Owns the Minerals?"; Shever, *Resources for Reform*; Perreault and Valdivia, "Hydrocarbons." For an example of radical resource politics from earlier in the century, see Nash, *We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us*.
64 Kohl and Farthing analyze this imaginary in relation to Bolivia's history of a militant miners' union that played a key role in the 1952 national revolution, and the eruption of protests against water and gas privatization in the early 2000s. See Kohl and Farthing, "Material Constraints," 229.
65 Kohl and Farthing, "Material Constraints," 229.

66 In Escobar's terms, Ecuador exemplified the conflict between "neo-developmentalism and post-development" (Escobar, "Latin America at a Crossroads," 20). See also Gudynas, "Value, Growth, Development"; the contributions to Munck and Delgado Wise (eds.), *Reframing Latin American Development* ; Svampa, *Debates latinoamericanos*, Part II, Chapter 2.

67 For existing scholarship, see Acosta, *La maldicion de la abundancia*; Albuja and Dávalos, "Extractivismo y posneoliberalismo"; Bebbington and Bebbington, "An Andean Avatar"; Burchardt and Dietz, "(Neo-)Extractivism"; Gudynas, "Diez tesis"; Gudynas, "Extractivisms"; Gustafson and Guzmán Solano, "Mining Movements and Political Horizons in the Andes"; Veltmeyer, "The Political Economy of Natural Resource Extraction"; Veltmeyer and Petras, *The New Extractivism*; Webber, "Revolution against 'Progress.'" Burchardt and Dietz do initially treat "(neo)-extractivism" as a concept that emerged in critical response to Pink Tide governments, but they proceed to employ it as an analytic and descriptive label. Lastly, Svampa takes an approach closer to mine, although her focus is primarily on professional intellectuals rather than activists: she defines the concept of extractivism and situates it within a dynamic field of debate over the model of development (Svampa, *Debates latinoamericanos*, Part II, Chapter 2).

68 Similarly, throughout the text I use Spanish words when their meaning is context-specific and/or not directly synonymous with English words. I define such terms in English whenever I use them.

69 Foucault, "Politics and the Study of Discourse," 60.

70 Foucault, "The Order of Discourse" and "Politics and the Study of Discourse."

71 Glaeser, *Political Epistemics*, 12–13.

72 Glaeser, *Political Epistemics,* 12–13.

73 For a discussion of shifts in the logic of action as the redeployment of existing techniques in new combinations, see Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population*, 22–4.

74 Boltanski and Chiapello, *New Spirit of Capitalism*; Wuthnow, *Communities of Discourse*.

75 Although, as I discuss below, no resource radicalism is wholly "new" (in that it involves the recombination or resignification of existing elements) and there is a temporal lag between the shift in governance and the modification or transformation of critique.

76 Bowen, "Multicultural Market Democracy."

77 The phrase "sociotechnical means" comes from Glaeser, *Political Epistemics*, 30: "Effects can flow from one person's action to be picked up by another without there being any reverse flow. In fact, the actions can be spatiotemporally separated, and actor and reactor need not—and very often and in highly complex societies typically do not—know each other. What makes this possible are sociotechnical means of projectively articulating actions across space and time through mediating communication, transportation, and storage." Timothy Mitchell refers to a similar set of material relationships that enable the diffusion of apparently disembodied "ideas" with the phrase "the acoustic machinery of their circulation" (Mitchell, *Carbon Democracy*, 69).

78 Agha, *Language and Social Relations*, 3.

79 Nakassis, "Materiality, Materialization," 403, original emphasis.

80 Nakassis, "Materiality, Materialization," 402, original emphasis.

81 As Marx writes, "The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life" (*The German Ideology,* 47).

82 For regimes of discourse, see Foucault, "The Order of Discourse"; Foucault, "Politics and the Study of Discourse." For problematics, see Althusser, *For Marx*, 49–86. For an analysis of discursive regimes that draws on Foucault, see Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine*.

83 One way to conceptualize this capacity is as performativity: under certain felicitous conditions—statements such as "I now pronounce you man and wife" or "I nominate you candidate"—the act of utterance calls into being the reality that it describes. See Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*; see also Agha, *Language and Social Relations*, 55–60; Searle, *Speech Acts*; Silverstein, "Metapragmatic Discourse and Metapragmatic Function," 45–8. Performativity also encompasses semiotic activity that is nonlinguistic and does not explicitly describe its social effects. See, e.g., Butler's analysis of the performance of gender: Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution"; Butler, *Gender Trouble*.

84 My use of the concept "problematic" draws on Althusser, albeit with a few substantial modifications (Althusser, *For Marx*, 49–86). He defines a problematic as the system of internal reference, the "principle of intelligibility," that unifies an ideology. It is "the system of *questions* commanding the *answers* given by the ideology" (67, original emphasis). Disagreements take place, and are intelligible within, the shared ground of a given problematic. Althusser further argues that the analyst's interpretation of a problematic must take into account "the existing *ideological field* and . . . the *social problems and social structure* which sustain the ideology and are reflected in it" (66, original emphasis). For Althusser, the locus of change between problematics cannot be found within a given problematic but must be located in the given conjuncture of social forces. He asserts that ideologies do not transform because of their own internal contradictions, or through progress to more rational systems of thought, but rather as a result of changes in their socio-historical conditions of possibility. In contrast to Althusser, however, I do not sharply distinguish between "ideology" (or, the term I use more often, "discourse") and the "objective problems" that actors confront. In line with Wedeen's work on political domination in Syria and democratic publics in Yemen (Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination* and *Peripheral Visions*), I argue instead that there is a mutually determining relationship between how we talk about social life and the social structures that constrain and enable certain forms of political action. The task of analysis is therefore to determine under what conditions changes in public discourse alter patterns of political action, and, conversely, transformations in forms of political action reconfigure the terms of debate. Finally, I am also explicitly interested in the piecemeal ways that actors respond to new historical circumstances by retooling their political visions and identities,

and, relatedly, how new problematics almost always involve recontextualized redeployments of discursive elements from earlier periods. Thus, what follows is not a stadial or epochal history of a transition between two hermetically sealed resource radicalisms, but rather a temporally complex narrative of the shift between salient modes of understanding and enacting politics in which actors often intermingle discursive strategies that index both past and current political conjunctures.

85 In other words, this ideological disagreement was oriented toward some shared concern and a degree of mutual recognition (Agha, *Language and Social Relations*, 172–3, 305; Boltanski and Thévenot, *On Justification*; Rancière, *Disagreement*). Or, in Mouffe's terms, the dispute over extractivism was "agonistic"—fought within a shared symbolic space—rather than "antagonistic" (Mouffe, *The Democratic Paradox*, 13).

86 Steinberg, "The Talk and Back Talk of Collective Action," 769.

87 For Bourdieu, a social field is a "configuration" of positions that stand in "objective" relationship to one another, in the sense that (borrowing from Marx) "they exist independently of individual consciousness or will" (Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, 66–7; see also Bourdieu and Wacquant, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology,* 97–105). Bourdieu's conceptualization of social fields has important drawbacks, namely his emphasis on individual (rather than collective) actors, and his difficulty accounting for change (Fligstein and McAdam, "Toward a General Theory of Strategic Action Fields," 19–20). For my usage of the word "terrain," see Gramsci, *The Prison Notebooks,* 172, 180–5.

88 See Warner's explanation of the distinction between a "targeted public" and the actual empirical circulation of discourse in Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 72–4.

89 For animation and reanimation, see Goffman, *Forms of Talk,* 131–4, 144–5; Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 87–9.

90 Warner, *Publics and Counterpublics*, 74.

91 See Arendt's analysis of the "frustration" of political action and speech in Arendt, *The Human Condition,* 220.

92 Nelson, *The Argonauts,* 29.

93 Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination,* 293–4.

94 This draws on a central insight of historical institutionalist theory, and one I argue applies to crystallized discourses, which I consider to be "institutions" in their own right. See Riofrancos, "Discursive Institutionalization."

95 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, 253–64.

96 Benjamin, *Illuminations*, 261.

97 For the phrase "repoliticized" see Hogenboom, "Depoliticized and Repoliticized Minerals." For examples of recent scholarly work on the topic, see Arce, *Resource Extraction and Protest in Peru*; Bebbington and Bury, *Subterranean Struggles*; Deonandan and Dougherty, *Mining in Latin America*; Haslam and Heidrich, *The Political Economy of Natural Resources and Development*; Haslam and Tanimoune, "The Determinants of Social Conflict in the Latin American Mining Sector"; Hindery,

From Enron to Evo; Humphreys Bebbington, "Consultation, Compensation and Conflict"; Mähler and Pierskallar, "Indigenous Identity, Natural Resources, and Contentious Politics in Bolivia"; Rosales, "Going Underground"; Svampa, "Commodities Consensus"; Tockman and Cameron, "Indigenous Autonomy and the Contradictions of Plurinationalism in Bolivia."

98 Karl, *Paradox of Plenty*; Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" and *Oil Curse*; Weyland, "The Rise of Latin America's Two Lefts." For the earlier rentier state literature that the resource curse concept draws upon, see Beblawi, "Rentier State"; Mahdavy, "Patterns and Problems."

99 For a discussion of the contrasting treatment of the state in the oil curse literature, see Smith, "Resource Wealth and Political Regimes" and *Hard Times*, Chapters 1, 2.

100 Haber and Menaldo, "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?"; Kurtz, "The Social Foundations of Institutional Order"; Luong and Weinthal, "Rethinking the Resource Curse" and *Oil Is Not a Curse*; Smith, *Hard Times*.

101 Smith, *Hard Times*, 7.

102 Dunning, *Crude Democracy*.

103 Mitchell, *Carbon Democracy*.

104 Mitchell, *Carbon Democracy.* For Mitchell's argument that coal extraction—and, specifically, militant coal-worker organization—enabled democratization, see *Carbon Democracy*, 12–42.

105 Bebbington and Bury, *Subterranean Struggles*; Bebbington et al., "Political Settlements"; Golub, *Leviathans at the Gold Mine*; Hindery, *From Enron to Evo*; Kohl and Farthing, "Material Constraints"; Latorre, Farrell, and Martínez-Alier, "Commodification of Nature"; Li, *Unearthing Conflict*; Perreault, "Tendencies in Tension"; Perreault and Valdivia, "Hydrocarbons"; Sawyer, *Crude Chronicles*; Shever, *Resources for Reform*; Watts, "Resource Curse?"

106 Most seminally, see Castañeda, "Latin America's Left Turn," but see also Flores-Macías, "Statist vs. Pro-Market," and Weyland, "The Rise of Latin America's Two Lefts."

107 For reflections on ethnographic approaches to the study of politics and power, see Auyero and Joseph, "Introduction"; Comaroff and Comaroff, "Ethnography on an Awkward Scale"; Ferguson and Gupta, "Spatializing States"; Glaeser, "An Ontology for the Ethnographic Analysis of Social Processes"; Schatz (ed.), *Political Ethnography*; Wedeen, "Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political Science."

Chapter 1: From *Neoliberalismo* to *Extractivismo*

1 Interview with the author, July 12, 2010.

2 As described in more detail below, in the 1960s and 1970s, military governments made tracts of land in the Amazon available to migrants from the highlands for human settlement and agriculture colonization. From the perspective of preexisting indigenous communities, this wave of colonization threatened their territorial autonomy, and led to conflicts between Amazonian indigenous groups and *colonos* (some of whom were members of highland indigenous communities).

CONCLUSION

The Dilemmas of the Pink Tide

On December 14, 2016, President Rafael Correa declared a state of emergency in the Amazonian province of Morona Santiago and deployed hundreds of troops and national police.[1] This marked the culmination of years of clashes at the site of an open-pit copper mine in the area of San Carlos that indigenous Shuar activists had occupied in protest against the expansion of mining and the threat it posed to their territory and livelihoods. Between 2009 and 2015, state forces killed three Shuar, either while they were protesting mining or defending their water rights. The months leading up to the 2016 state of emergency saw military raids and the destruction of Shuar villages, homes, tools, and agricultural plots. In mid-December, the conflict reached its peak in a fight that left a policeman dead, prompting Correa to call in the military. The state of emergency officially lasted three months, but as of late 2017 there were ongoing reports of checkpoints, harassment, and criminalization, and the mining camp was still a militarized zone. Correa continued to verbally attack the Shuar in his weekly public addresses, and Shuar communities continued to protest.

This episode was not an isolated event. It epitomized a decades-long regional conjuncture of intensified extraction and related social conflict. With the implementation of neoliberal reforms, investment in mining exploration in Latin America soared, growing by 400 percent compared to 90 percent globally between 1990 and 1997.[2] During the commodity boom that lasted from 2000 to 2014, the region remained one of the world's top destinations for mining investment.[3] Latin America has likewise stood out in terms of local contention around interrelated extractive, energy, and infrastructure projects.[4] And these conflicts were often violent: in 2017 alone, 197 "land and environment defenders" were killed across the globe.[5] Some 60 percent of these

murders occurred in Latin America, making it the world's deadliest region for activists resisting mining, oil, agribusiness, and similar projects. The pattern of protest in Ecuador was in keeping with these regional dynamics, both in terms of frequency and intensity, and in terms of its historical arc. Conflict in response to "accumulation by dispossession" (whether open-pit mining, oil exploration, or shrimp farming) that began during the neoliberal period continued and intensified under Correa's post-neoliberal government.[6]

In addition to causing social conflict, the expansion of the extractive frontier also deepened the region's economic dependency. Projects were in large part financed through foreign capital, and extractive sectors' export-orientation left economies and states vulnerable to the volatile prices of raw materials. The commodity boom and subsequent bust represented the opportunities and perils of this mode of integration into global capitalism. For many of the region's inhabitants, these turbulent years unfolded in the context of a historic wave of leftist governments. These Pink Tide administrations were committed to not only reducing poverty and inequality but also to transforming the economic model, democratizing the state, and attaining sovereignty. Whether or not these lofty goals were achieved, the combination of export-led economic growth and redistributive policies pulled tens of millions of people out of poverty and mitigated inequality in the most unequal region of the world.

The combination of dramatic improvements in material well-being, renewed dependency, and contentious politics amid an unprecedented political mandate for the electoral Left occasioned a profound debate over development.[7] In this debate, elected leaders and activists invoked—and contested—the historical paradigms of resource nationalism, dependency theory, and endogenous development.[8] They also articulated new visions of regional integration, neo-developmentalism, post-extractivism, *sumak kawsay*/*buen vivir*, and eco-socialism.[9] These concepts, and the social practices they indexed and imagined, served as an inspiration to activists and progressive policymakers in the United States, Canada, and Europe.

But such aspirations for a region transformed would soon implode. In 2013, Hugo Chávez, the first president elected in what would later be named the Pink Tide, died of cancer. The next year, the commodity boom came to a decisive end with a precipitous drop in oil prices, and recessions followed. In quick succession, these dramatic events were followed by the election of the conservative president Mauricio Macri in Argentina, the parliamentary coup that removed Dilma Rousseff from power in Brazil, Bolivian voters' rejection in a popular referendum of Evo Morales's attempt to run for a fourth term

(a rejection subsequently overruled by the country's Constitutional Court), Venezuela's descent into seemingly intractable political-economic crisis, and, finally, the 2018 defeat of the Brazilian Workers' Party presidential candidate Fernando Haddad by Jair Bolsonaro, an open admirer of the military dictatorship that ruled that country from 1964 to 1985. The Left was in retreat and right-wing politics ascendant. Only Mexico, where the leftist candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador was elected president in a landslide victory, bucked the trend. What went wrong?

As is the case with any attempt to specify a moment of rupture, the exercise of dating the end of the Pink Tide inevitably slips into the infinitely recursive dialectic of the period and the break.[10] When, precisely, did the "retreat" begin? In 2014, with the end of the cycle of export-led economic growth? In 2012, when the "delayed reverberation of the global crisis" first began to perturb the economic underpinnings of a "'mutually' beneficial relationship between capital and labor"?[11] Or was it an earlier shift in the broader ecosystem of the Left in Latin America, away from rebellious street protests and popular assemblies and toward elections, campaigns, and parties, with all their connotations of political moderation, leader-centric personalism, and organizational hierarchy? Or had the Pink Tide been doomed from the start? Was the aspiration to capture state institutions, democratize them, and redeploy them to serve the interests of the oppressed ultimately a quixotic project, always already fated to fail, whether by the iron law of oligarchy, the disciplining effects of the iron cage of state bureaucracy, or the assured reaction of the ruling class?[12] Or perhaps the ebb of the tide was not so much a result of the ascent to state power but rather a product of social movements' lack of structural leverage, in turn a product of a prior era of neoliberal reforms that deprived the working class of the conditions of cohesive, and threatening, political organization?[13] Either way, the search for the beginning of the end ultimately ends up back at the beginning—or before it.

As Fredric Jameson declared, we cannot *not* periodize. Without narratives, history amounts to an "endless series of sheer facts" or, in Walter Benjamin's oft-quoted phrasing, "one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet."[14] Each of these narratives offers a valuable perspective on what is inevitably an overdetermined process.[15] Drawing on their insights, I focus my analysis specifically on the period in which leftist governments were in power. This is not to downplay the ways that prior decades of neoliberalism had structured the political terrain, or the fact that anti-neoliberal movements were the condition of possibility of the Pink Tide, but rather to zoom in on the relationship between leftist governments and left-

ist movements. This relationship is marked by a dialectic of governance and resistance—and disputes between political forces with shared experiences in struggle and intellectual formations.

During the Pink Tide, leftist governments and leftist movements faced vexing dilemmas with broader lessons for processes of radical transformation across the globe. From the position of the government, how do you achieve economic equality without deepening economic dependency? How do you democratize the state while also strengthening it against global capital and domestic elites? From the position of social movements, how do you protest against the state when the government's avowed goals align with your long-standing demands from below? And, given the political economy described in this book, how do you organize around territorial dispossession and socio-environmental harm, as well as build a mass coalition that includes those who economically benefit from resource-funded welfare?

Pink Tide governments inherited, and intensified, a model of accumulation based on the extraction and export of natural resources. This model enabled important forms of socioeconomic inclusion and political empowerment for the masses, while simultaneously undermining more radical transformations. Reactions from the domestic right and transnational capital also imposed a serious constraint on leftist governance. This is the case for the Left anywhere in the world. But in Latin America, and the Global South more broadly, this constraint binds more tightly due to the conditions of dependency and deep inequality.

Anti-extractive movements faced challenges as well. On the one hand, they demonstrated the capacity to stall or disrupt both oil and mining projects at the local level. On the other hand, directly affected communities and allied environmental activists had difficulty assembling a popular sector coalition at the national scale with the power to articulate and enact an alternative to the extractive model.

In a warming world riven by inequality, it is more vital than ever to understand the accomplishments and the shortcomings of both of these leftist orientations to extraction. In what follows, I will reflect on the Left-in-power and then on the Left-in-resistance. While most of this book has featured the voices and actions of situated actors directly involved in governance and resistance, and has especially highlighted discursive innovations on the part of anti-extractive protesters, in this concluding chapter I also attend to the contributions of regional critical intellectuals as well as their interlocutors in the United States and Europe. Most of these intellectuals have themselves been involved in processes of social mobilization, and in some cases have held

office in leftist administrations. Their appraisals of Pink Tide governments and anti-extractive resistance, and their proposals for a post-extractive future, represent the most important contributions of contemporary Latin American critical thought to leftist politics around the world.

A brief clarification before moving forward. Dilemmas are not "failings." They are the challenging choices and situations that any attempt to transform the world encounters. They are constituted by the entanglement of radical potentialities, concrete achievements, and disappointing limitations. In that spirit, I will close this conclusion on a note of generosity to the Left-in-power and the Left-in-resistance. Both forms of leftism are urgently essential to address the planetary crisis in its ecological and political dimensions.

Dilemmas of the Left-in-Power

For the Left-in-power, hydrocarbon and mineral resources provide crucial revenues to fund social spending and public infrastructure. In a deeply unequal society, such policies directly benefit the majority of the population and consolidate the electoral Left's political support. For the Left in Latin America, equally important is the ideological resonance of resource nationalism: if a country is rich in natural resources, the benefits should flow to the people in the broadest sense, not just to the rich and foreign corporations. In this section, I evaluate leftist governments' achievements and shortcomings with regard to two key goals: sovereignty and equality.

In Ecuador, a long history of popular demands for nationalization, rooted not only in militancy amongst oil workers but also in the indigenous movements that would go on to reject extractivism *tout court*, framed natural resources as the collective property of the sovereign people. Here, sovereignty means the opposite of dependency, a condition with dimensions that are at once local (the disarticulation of enclaves from the national economy), national (the political alliance of domestic elites and foreign investors), regional (economic competition with neighboring countries), and global (the role of international capital and vulnerability to commodity prices).

However, it is precisely the goal of sovereignty that the reliance on primary commodity exports renders elusive. Instead, this reliance has implicated Latin American countries in new forms of dependency—especially vis-à-vis an ascendant China—and exposed them to the boom-and-bust cycles of global commodity markets. Despite important innovations in the contract model for oil and mining concessions that increased the state's take, the extent of classic nationalizations via wholesale expropriation has been quite limited. Rather,

forced divestments, majority equity stakes, and joint ventures predominate.[16] Thus, foreign firms retain significant influence over the extractive process, the territories in which it unfolds, and the very state agencies ostensibly tasked with its regulation. It is thus perhaps in extractive sectors that we see some of the clearest continuities across neoliberal and avowedly post-neoliberal reforms. More fundamentally, if in the midcentury variant of developmentalism the goal was rapid industrialization, which would progressively reduce the share of the economy occupied by extraction while climbing the ladder of economic sophistication, the "neo-developmentalism" of the Pink Tide made peace with service sector-dominated labor markets and prioritized extraction over manufacturing.[17] And exporting countries, rather than coordinating to protect prices, enforce standards for revenue sharing, or jointly adopt labor and environmental regulations, have competed for investment. They thus betrayed promises of regional integration and mutually reinforced their peripheral status.[18]

The dilemmas of national sovereignty also raise the question: Who is "the nation" presumed to be the owner of resource wealth?[19] This national subject already had a long and multivalent history. In Ecuador, it had been first articulated from above, by a developmentalist military government intent on asserting state control over the oil sector, and then, decades later, from below, by a rebellious popular sector coalition that claimed popular sovereignty over subsoil resources. The further problematization of this identity was also the product of multiple developments. Across decades of conflicts with the state and extractive firms, indigenous groups have defined themselves as "nations" and "peoples," and claimed sovereignty and territorial self-determination.[20] These claims were bolstered by the 2008 Constitution, which defined Ecuador as a plurinational state and stipulated a slate of new collective rights for indigenous, Afro-Ecuadorian, and Montubian communities. Meanwhile, with the election of a leftist president, the anti-neoliberal grassroots coalition, which the national and regional indigenous federations historically played a vital role in coordinating, lost its oppositional force and organizational unity. By pitting indigenous and environmentalist activists against the beneficiaries of state spending, Correa contributed to this dynamic. His administration's vilification and criminalization of anti-extractive protesters exacerbated the fragmentation of the "social bloc of the oppressed" that had spearheaded anti-neoliberal protest.[21] The "nation" to which Correa continued to appeal—the "nation" first articulated by the popular sector coalition that had brought him to power years before—was thus increasingly unmoored from its historical conditions of articulation: meetings, assemblies, protests, and the shared

discursive repertoire woven through these actions. It became an ideological resource for commodity-fueled, top-down leftist populism rather than a reflexively mediated collective subjectivity.

In addition to the challenge of asserting sovereignty, the reliance on resource rents presented dilemmas for the core leftist goal of equality. In boom times, resource rents enable material benefits for the least well-off precisely because they do not require income redistribution, let alone expropriation. Echoing the postwar social-democratic bargain in core capitalist states, itself enabled by abundant cheap energy, commodity export-led growth is a positive-sum game: governments can boost the incomes of the poor without reducing the wealth of the rich, thus ensuring the political support of the former without provoking the reaction of the latter. Furthermore, the "compensatory state" helps mitigate the social conflict around extraction: for a democratically elected, leftist government, responding to anti-extractive resistance with repression alone is not politically viable.[22] Whence the contractual innovations and legislative reforms that channel resource revenues to directly affected communities.[23]

Under Correa's decade in power, the combination of sustained growth, increased state revenues, and redistributive social spending (which doubled as a percentage of GDP) made a significant impact: poverty plummeted from 37.6 to 22.5 percent.[24] The improvement in material well-being of the poor, working class, and lower-middle classes has been argued to represent a "second incorporation," comparable to the region's midcentury official recognition of unions, codification of collective bargaining rights, and increases in welfare spending.[25] It is also important to note that, in some cases, this incorporation went beyond welfare payments and involved substantive, grassroots empowerment—even if in a tense relationship to simultaneous efforts to secure top-down control. In Venezuela under Chávez, for example, there were experiments in involving the poor as protagonists in the participatory planning of municipal budgets, land use, water management, and even economic production (via technical boards, land committees, communal councils, and communes).[26] In the case of Bolivia, social movements achieved significant influence within Morales's Movement for Socialism party, over both candidate selection and policy orientation.[27]

Increasing popular sector income, while a good in and of itself, also expanded domestic markets for consumer goods. In the absence of state regulation, this in turn encouraged firm consolidation and the increasing concentration of capital. Healthcare is a case in point. Universalizing access to healthcare and offering as many free services as possible was a major priority for the Correa administration. This was also a boon to private firms.[28] As the

state did not build the capacity to directly provide all health services, the sector depended on public-private partnerships that transformed state spending into private profit. In addition, since the state-owned pharmaceutical company produced a tiny portion of prescription drugs (0.04 percent) and there was little regulation of the pharmaceutical market, the increased spending on healthcare (both by the state and by consumers) proved a windfall for the top two pharmaceutical companies, which soon controlled virtually the entire drug market. A similar dynamic held in the exploding construction sector. As these sectors grew, so did the political influence of their leading businesses, rendering it less and less likely that the state would strengthen regulations (as exemplified by the ongoing fallout from the region-wide Odebrecht corruption scheme).[29] Changes in class structure compounded these market dynamics: with more discretionary income, new consumer habits reshaped the political subjectivity of leftist governments' popular sector constituency. Even if economically precarious, an emergent "middle-class" identity was politically mobilized by centrist and right-wing political forces.[30] Meanwhile, when the commodity bust slashed state revenues in 2014, even avowedly leftist governments resorted to austerity measures—thus weakening their political support.

This volatile pattern of state spending maps onto boom-and-bust cycles. For states that depend on resource rents for their fiscal base, global market conditions are an important constraint on budgets, especially if they have low rates of domestic taxation. And oil prices function as a particularly tight constraint for Ecuador, which is a "price-taker," and which, additionally, uses the US dollar as its currency and is thus deprived of the tool of expansionary monetary policy.[31] But contra conventional depictions of "rentier states," which predict that governments will distribute windfall revenues to appease rival elites and mass constituencies (while repressing dissidents), price cycles alone cannot explain the content or targets of expenditures.[32] The specific forms state spending took under the Correa administration—monthly cash transfer programs, health services and education, public infrastructure (especially highways), and targeted investments in communities directly affected by oil and mining projects—were shaped by longer trajectories of state-formation and social conflict, and inflected by the particular understanding of post-neoliberalism that circulated among state actors. The monthly cash transfer program (*Bono de desarrollo humano*) and expanded social services were a response to long-standing social movement demands for the redistribution of resource wealth to the popular sectors—and a way to pay off the "social debt" accrued under neoliberalism and deepened by the 1998–9 financial crisis.

Meanwhile, in a state historically characterized by territorially uneven capacity, new public infrastructure facilitated political incorporation and market integration, and served as a potent display of state presence (reinforced by the billboards that accompanied all new public works projects, proclaiming the "Citizens' Revolution" and stating the precise amount spent).[33] The fact that state actors tended to define neoliberalism as the absence of the state and, as a corollary, defined post-neoliberalism as its assertive presence only further encouraged this highly visible form of public intervention in socioeconomic life.[34] Lastly, the history of intense, localized conflict around extractive projects—conflicts that only increased in frequency and militancy during Correa's years in office—incentivized state planners and bureaucrats to channel resource revenues to directly affected communities.

These interwoven trajectories shaped spending decisions and their political, economic, social, and symbolic consequences. Against simplistic versions of the "resource curse" framework, commodity booms (or busts) do not tell us much about the specific content of state policy. Indeed, defying the stereotypes of the rentier state, during the boom the Correa administration made important progress in expanding direct taxation and, with new taxes on large properties and capital exports, in making fiscal policy more progressive.[35] Spending, however, outpaced both resource rents and new taxes, and Ecuador became increasingly indebted to China as well as to regional development banks. Further, the reliance on resource rents for both broad redistribution and targeted spending on the directly affected only reinforced the extractive imperative, which, as Eduardo Gudynas argues, in turn "create[s] new social and environmental impacts that will require new compensations."[36] When anti-extractive activists mobilized against these intensified socio-environmental impacts, state actors invoked redistribution and compensation policies to legitimize the expansion of the extractive frontier.[37] The tendency to ratchet up social spending evidences the provisionality of any "political settlement" in extractive economies, and the mutually reinforcing and ideologically mediated dynamic of broad redistribution, localized compensation, and extractive development.[38]

Across the region, declining commodity prices—beginning in 2012 for agricultural exports, and then for oil in 2014, decisively ending the boom—destabilized the balance of class forces that had provided leftist governments with a modicum of protection from conservative reaction. As Jeffrey Webber writes, despite benefiting from the years of sustained export-led growth over which leftist governments presided, economic elites were ultimately not loyal: "during a drop in profitability and increasing political instability, cap-

italists returned to their natural home of old or new-right configurations."[39] Meanwhile, the characteristics of the model of accumulation and accompanying state-society relations described above—popular incorporation via welfare programs and compensations for directly affected communities, both paid for by windfall resource rents, and the fragmentation of the grassroots coalition that had protested neoliberalism—limited leftist governments' options once revenues shrank. From Venezuela to Brazil to Ecuador, austerity measures undermined grassroots support at the same time that elites defected and, in some cases, turned to extra-electoral means to remove the Left from power.

For a time, Bolivia was the semi-exception that proved the rule: its gas exports depend more on regional than global demand and were therefore less affected by China's slowing growth rates. This, in combination with prudent macroeconomic planning, dampened the effects of the commodity bust.[40] But even there, all aspects of the changing conjuncture eventually applied. Voters' rejection of Evo Morales's bid to change the constitution in order to run for a fourth term reflected declining popularity and the disaffection of parts of his base. In the fall of 2019, protests swept the country. The unrest hinged on allegations of fraud in the October 20 elections and mobilized large numbers of urban middle classes. The contention was quickly channeled by elite reactionary forces, causing Morales to flee the country after the military "suggested" he resign.[41] As I write these final pages, a conservative interim government has taken power, police and military are violently repressing dissent, and the outcome is far from certain.

It was in this evolving regional context that in 2017 Alianza País faced its most competitive national election since Correa took power, with Lenín Moreno barely defeating wealthy banker Guillermo Lasso in the second round of the presidential elections.[42] In Ecuador, as elsewhere on the continent, the retreat of the Left-in-power was overdetermined.

For the decade and a half of the Pink Tide, leftist governments did not monopolize leftist politics. In collaboration and conflict with these administrations was the Left-in-resistance: social movements employed extra-electoral means of mobilization and protest, and pushed political parties and elected officials to enact the sweeping transformations promised in campaign platforms, inauguration speeches, and opening ceremonies of constituent assemblies. The relationship between state officials and social movement activists varied across national contexts and evolved over time. And, as argued throughout this book, "the state" is not a monolithic entity, but rather a variegated terrain shot through with internal disputes, asymmetric power relations, and a range of institutional spaces that are more or less open to ac-

tivist pressure (or, conversely, to alliances with economic elites). Despite this diversity and site-specific nuance, in all cases Pink Tide governments neither fully implemented grassroots demands nor fully co-opted, demobilized, or repressed social movements. Unaddressed grievances combined with continued bottom-up capacity meant that intra-leftist contention was an ongoing feature of the Left-in-power. In this regional setting, Ecuador stands out as evincing especially agonistic confrontations between a leftist national government and the social movements and radical intellectuals that originally supported its leader's rise to power, and from the ranks of which some of his top bureaucrats were appointed. Once extractivism crystallized as the crux of dispute, a polarized dynamic ensued, diminishing possibilities for collaboration.

Dilemmas of the Left-in-Resistance

In Ecuador and elsewhere, just as the Left-in-power was caught by a series of dilemmas, so too was the Left-in-resistance. Just as the former's achievements were limited by the contradictions of a political-economic model that it in part inherited and in part newly constructed, the latter came up against the contradictions of a critique and strategy centered on mobilizing those directly affected against extractive development. Anti-extractive movements can claim impressive accomplishments: they stalled specific extractive projects and reshaped the broader debate over resource extraction, forcing state actors and firms to respond to a new set of grievances and demands. However, to date, anti-extractive activists have not mobilized a mass movement of the scale and strength of the anti-neoliberal popular sector coalition that swept the leftist governments into office in the first place. To understand this set of achievements and limits, it is worth reflecting on three distinct sets of dilemmas of the resource radicalism of the Left-in-resistance: first, the dilemmas of *extractivismo* as critique; second, the dilemmas of post-extractivism as positive vision; and third, the dilemmas of anti-extractivism as political strategy. I explore each in turn.

First, the dilemmas of *extractivismo* as critique. Extractivism is the central term of a critical discourse that recombines preexisting strains of Latin American thought with more recent discourses around the environment and indigeneity. It constitutes a critique of the social formation it calls extractivism, into which it folds the traditional Left, seeing in both capitalism and state socialism a wanton disregard for socio-natural harmony.

This critique is indebted to dependency theory, expanding on the latter's evaluation of economies organized around the export of primary commodities.[43]

It shares with this school of thought a narrative that begins with the violence of colonial encounter and traces its enduring effects in neocolonial patterns of "plunder, accumulation, concentration, and devastation."[44] Like its progenitors, the framework of *extractivismo* attends to the constitutive territorial unevenness of global capitalism, and, more specifically, to the fractal structure of cores and peripheries, a structure relentlessly reproduced via the ever-expanding extractive frontier. In this sense, both Pink Tide governments' renewed resource nationalism and anti-extractivism drew on the repertoire of dependency theory. The former saw underdevelopment as rooted in the historic absence of national sovereignty and as a corollary regarded state-directed extraction as a route to equitable development; the latter focused on the pathologies of the "super-exploitation" of natural resources for export.[45]

The critical discourse of *extractivismo* also deviates from leftist tradition. Dependency theorists contemplated routes out of the situation of dependency. Indeed, theorists were sharply divided over nationalist-developmentalist versus revolutionary paths to development.[46] The first hoped for an alliance of the state and national capital, whereas the second hoped to overthrow both dependency and capital at once. In contrast, *extractivismo* discourse not only rejects "development" as a goal but regards the extractive model as deeply embedded in social structure, ideology, and even subjectivity, thus troubling the very possibility of revolutionary transformation.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the framework of *extractivismo* combines a *longue durée* timescale (from colonial conquest to the present) with attention to the expansionary territorial dynamic of extraction. According to Gudynas, the pathologies of extractivism travel far beyond the sites of extraction.[47] In order to advance a specific extractive project, governments might dismantle environmental and labor protections, or adopt an investor-friendly contract model. But the "spill-over effects" of these policy reforms facilitate extractive projects more generally.[48] The transportation infrastructure that accompanies extractive projects also triggers a domino effect of territorial reorganization, as new roads attract human settlement, expand the agricultural frontier, and lead to further deforestation.[49] From the perspective of *extractivismo* as critique, the ideological spillover effects are even more pervasive. In this rendering, extractivism becomes hegemonic common sense, what Maristella Svampa refers to as "the commodities consensus," which structures the parameters of politics and operates on an affective register to bind subjects to the logic of extractive capital.[50] Employing a telling biological metaphor, Alberto Acosta refers to "extractivist DNA entrenched (*enquistado*) in our societies" and a sort of extractivist cunning that "traps" even critics of capitalism in its

nefarious tentacles.[51] In short, by shaping subjectivity, extractivism "builds culture."[52]

The flipside of the breadth, depth, and coherence of this critique is a twofold challenge. First, given this depiction of extractivism, it is difficult to account for the emergence, circulation, and political impact of the critical discourse of *extractivismo.* Analysts of extractivism tend not to reconcile their assertion of its hegemonic status with their discussion of the contention over the extractive model of development. Second, and perhaps more importantly, is the implied difficulty of articulating a post-extractive vision and an anti-extractive strategy. If extractivism is a total, ideologically closed system with a variety of internal mechanisms ensuring its reproduction and expansion, it would appear to foreclose the possibility of transformation, short of an exogenous shock. Whence the problem of envisioning how a post-extractive society could be built starting from the extractive society that currently exists. Relatedly, there are the challenges of anti-extractivism as political strategy. Namely, who is the imagined collective subject leading this transformative process? How is this subject composed, and by what means could it dismantle extractivism and assemble a post-extractive society in its place? In what follows, I attend to each of these sets of difficult tasks: post-extractivism as positive vision and anti-extractivism as political strategy.

Chronologically prior to a post-extractive society would be post-extractive transition. Or, at least, a concerted effort to wind down extractive projects, secure alternative sources of state revenue, and remediate social and environmental harm. In embarking on such a concerted effort, there would be the immediate obstacle of capital's disciplinary power: revoking concessions or modifying contractual conditions inevitably provokes foreign firms to appeal to investor arbitration tribunals. Recently in Ecuador, four oil firms have appealed to such tribunals, resulting in awards of nearly $2 billion to three of them, and the reversal of a $9.5 billion dollar ruling in Ecuador's favor.[53] (This is one domain where anti-extractive activists could learn from their resource nationalist opponents, given the latter's experience in implementing expropriations, forced contract renegotiations, and loan defaults—all of which can result in legal actions from investors or creditors.)

This hurdle aside, there is the question of the complex temporality of a post-extractive transition. While anti-extractive activists demanded an immediate cessation of oil and mining projects in the heat of political struggle, allied radical intellectuals and policy researchers have theorized a "planned decrease" that would phase out extraction while still channeling extractive rents to address social needs until, first, new economic sectors are developed, and second,

state taxation capacity is consolidated.[54] Such plans must avoid the trap of an ever-deferred post-extractive future. To wit, even the critical bureaucrats I spoke with invoked the impossibility of an "overnight" (*de la noche a la mañana*) transition in order to justify the expansion of extraction.[55] In this way, as Webber writes, increasing popular sector "consumptive capacities" became an end in itself, "rather than the basis for more audacious structural ruptures with the existing order."[56] Directly addressing this pitfall, Miriam Lang distinguishes between the pace and the direction of change, arguing for prioritizing the latter in evaluating the process of creating a post-extractive society.[57] Gudynas conceives of this directionality in terms of an initial shift from the reigning "predatory" model of extractivism to "sensible" extractivism—wherein socio-environmental regulations are strengthened and enforced, which itself would necessitate a simultaneous increase in state capacity and reduction in current levels of extractive activity—followed by a shift to "indispensable" extractivism, which is the minimum resource extraction necessary to "ensure people's quality of life under the field of sustainability" and within the parameters of national and regional supply chains.[58] Regional coordination is not only key to reorient production and consumption toward satisfying human needs while maintaining ecological balance, but also to avoid the race-to-the-bottom competitive dynamic that undermines regulatory capacities.[59]

If transitioning away from the extractive model raises the challenges associated with any lengthy policy process unfolding over time, there is the further dilemma of articulating a positive vision for a new type of society. *Sumak kawsay/buen vivir* ("living well") aims to offer precisely that. In the broader activist and academic conversation around alternative models of development, *sumak kawsay/buen vivir* is an adjacent discourse to that of post-extractivism. It imagines a society that would be founded on the principle of harmony between individuals, communities, and nature, governed by social relations rooted in reciprocity and solidarity, and that would prioritize "the reproduction of life"—broadly understood to encompass nonhuman nature—"not of capital."[60] Though often framed in terms of indigenous "cosmovisions" and livelihoods, and inflected by collective memory, *sumak kawsay/buen vivir* is both a recent discourse, emerging at the turn of the millennium, and oriented toward the future, envisioned as "Andean and Amazonian utopias."[61] But the concept's ambiguity unsettles its own utopian vision. This is in part due to the versatility of the Quechua word *kawsay*, a portmanteau dating to early colonial Peru, the meanings of which have "ranged from basic connotations of existence and subsistence to appraisals of health and well-being."[62] Moreover, it reflects the distinct and even mutually opposed political projects to which the concept has

been attached. Existing in the "'cultural borderlands' between indigeneity and dominant capitalist society," *sumak kawsay/buen vivir* echoes both mainstream and more radical discourses around environmental sustainability and indigenous rights.[63] Across the region, critics of extractivism use the concept in a critical and utopian register to critique what exists from the standpoint of a desired future. But it also appears in the preamble of Ecuador's 2008 Constitution (as well as framing multiple sections of the text), emblazons official documents, and constituted a key term in official discourse.[64] In addition, state actors have used the concept to promote new frontiers of commodification and accumulation, such as the bio-knowledge sector.[65] These ambiguities in the meaning of *sumak kawsay/buen vivir* shape and are shaped by its contours of circulation. In my fieldwork experience, compared to the key terms I have focused on in this book—extractivism, territory, prior consultation, community, water—*sumak kawsay/buen vivir* circulated less frequently among anti-extractive activists. This may seem surprising, given the attention this paradigm has received among scholars of the region. It is difficult to interpret a silence, but my sense was that Ecuadorian activists saw this concept as tainted by its use in official discourse and specifically by the glaring contradiction, in their view, between the state's avowed commitment to *sumak kawsay/buen vivir* and policies that promoted extraction.

In addition to these conceptual ambiguities, post-extractive utopian visions such as *sumak kawsay/buen vivir* face the dilemma of territorial scale.[66] Whether the focus is on sustainable agriculture, artisanal production, governing the commons of water, land, and other shared resources, or cultural practices that would re-embed social life in nature, the recurrent point of departure for these visions is a small, rural—and usually indigenous—community. The focus on this particular socio-spatial context raises at least two challenges related to scale: first, the challenge of scaling "up" from the local community to increasingly more encompassing orders of social life; and second, the challenge of scaling "out" from the rural to the urban. One key means of addressing the first challenge are creation of national policies that encourage local-level experimentation and provide resources to replicate and scale up viable initiatives. Such an approach, sometimes referred to as a "solidarity economy," would require complementary policies of land and water redistribution, and local participation in territorial planning and budget allocation.[67] The implementation of such policies would in turn be more likely in a political setting in which social movements had the leverage to demand their adoption and/or were more substantively represented in state institutions.[68] Addressing the second scalar challenge would require movement linkages and policy diffusion

between anti-extractive activism and urban movements for public housing, mass transit, and green spaces—all of which are essential components of a non-extractive, low-carbon vision of living well.[69]

The challenge of territorial scale is closely linked to the third and final set of challenges facing the Left-in-resistance: those related to political strategy. There are myriad dimensions to social movement strategy, but here, I focus on the *collective subject* of resistance, understood as the protagonist and the emergent outcome of processes of social mobilization. As discussed throughout this book, anti-extractivism centers on the directly affected community. Such communities, located in the immediate zones of extraction, are at once the collective subject and geographical site of protest against oil and mining development. The local territorialization of resistance is a strength and a limit. On the one hand, community-level mobilization can obstruct a crucial chokepoint in the political economy of extraction and, by slowing or stalling specific projects, shape the global contours of the extractive frontier.[70] On the other hand, this form of mobilization faces the difficulty of assembling a broader popular sector coalition with the capacity to take political power and transform the model of accumulation.

Across the region, scholars have noted an increase in resource-related conflict, especially in the expanding mining sector—a pattern that holds true for Ecuador.[71] This conflict has increasingly taken the form of local opposition to extractive projects and/or demands for greater compensation, pitting directly affected communities against firms and, often, the state agencies that promote or oversee the extractive process. Several factors account for this proliferation of local protest. The uneven territoriality of extraction, and more importantly its socio-environmental impacts, is key among them. Geography, however, is not destiny. Rather, the relationship between local communities—starting with their very self-identification as "directly affected"—is highly mediated by contextually specific social, economic, and political conditions, resulting in varying levels of opposition across zones of extraction. Militant opposition to oil and mining projects is more likely in cases of new projects (especially in areas without a prior history of extraction) that threaten preexisting economic livelihoods, disrupt collective consumption or social reproduction, or conflict with place-based cultural practices.[72] Project type, scale, and ownership also matter: in the mining sector, foreign-owned, large-scale, open-pit mines are particularly contentious.[73] In addition, legal norms and community-level political organization shape the form resistance takes. The salience of the "directly affected community" is in part a product of the availability of international and national legal instruments such as the *consulta* and the writ

of *amparo* (also referred to as a *tutela* in Colombia), which aim to protect human rights from their violation by states or corporations. These instruments recognize the local community as a subject of particular rights and provide an institutional venue to contest projects, whether local consultations, social participation in environmental impact assessments, or domestic and regional courts.[74] And communities that are already politically organized (for example, via neighborhood associations, water committees, indigenous organizations) and allied with movements at other scales are more equipped to deploy such instruments in political battle with firms and states.[75]

Under these specific conditions, local communities are a powerful geographical site and collective protagonist of protest. Given their spatial proximity to a key node of the extractive process, they have the capacity to stall and disrupt projects. And, when communities join together in broader alliances, such protests can potentially shape policies beyond the local level. However, an anti-extractive strategy that centers on directly affected communities is also by its nature a limited one: the legal and moral force of their grievances and demands is rooted in claims of spatial proximity and, often, particular rights linked to that proximity (and/or to ethnic status). Even though this strategy has proven effective at contesting specific projects, it is thus contained by the fragmented and uneven territoriality of extraction.[76] Moreover, as illustrated in the opening vignette to this conclusion, in the absence of strong alliances and organized solidarity, the territorial isolation of directly affected communities can leave them vulnerable to state repression.[77]

In order to shift from a defensive position of resistance to an offensive position of political hegemony, anti-extractivism would need to join forces with a broader coalition of rural and urban popular sectors. Such a coalition would include not only those who are not immediately harmed by extraction, but also those who stand to benefit from the social programs and public infrastructure currently funded by resource rents. This is a population that, under prevailing conceptions of the "directly affected," is much larger than frontline communities.

Recent contention in Ecuador brings into relief the challenges of assembling such a coalition under the banner of anti-extractivism. On October 1, 2019, President Lenín Moreno—Correa's successor and erstwhile political ally—implemented a series of austerity measures as part of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund. Among these measures was the elimination of a long-standing subsidy for gasoline and diesel. Immediately, a coalition comprising the national labor federation (FUT), the national student union (FEUE), and CONAIE announced protests. Ten days later, after massive

demonstrations filled the streets of Quito, briefly occupied the National Assembly as well as multiple oil fields in the Amazon, and ultimately forced the government to temporarily relocate to Guayaquil, the Moreno administration agreed to negotiate with CONAIE. As a result of their dialogue, protesters achieved their primary demand of the reinstatement of fuel subsidies, as well as an official investigation into state repression that resulted in nine deaths, over one thousand injured, and over one thousand arrests.[78]

Among the most remarkable aspects of this episode of contention was the re-articulation of a popular sector coalition—labor, youth, and indigenous; rural and urban; sierra and Amazon—with CONAIE playing a key leadership role. The resonance with the mid-1990s was striking. And, crucially, this provisional alliance was not anti-extractivist in orientation; it was, if anything, radical resource nationalist. Despite the fact that fuel subsidies are regressive (the rich use more fuel than the poor), for those living at the margins of their income in a petro-state, such subsidies are an important form of social welfare and a powerful symbol of petro-nationalism. How might anti-extractivism transform to encompass a similarly territorially diverse bloc of the oppressed?

The articulation of the directly affected as protagonist and site of anti-extractive resistance is neither natural nor inevitable, but itself a product of political scale-making.[79] And as a corollary, identities and interests can be rescaled. Indeed, "scale shifting" is a central component of successful social movements. Through alliances and solidarity, movements can expand their mobilizational capacity beyond those most immediately or severely impacted by a given form of oppression, and, by linking overlapping grievances and demands, expand their collective identity and interests.[80] Across the Americas, there are inspiring examples of such coalitions. In 2018 in El Salvador, an alliance of anti-mining groups, progressive Catholic leaders, and national environmental NGOs pressured the government to adopt the world's first national ban on mining for metals. For this movement, the defense of water was a central concern.[81] Activism against large-scale mining first scaled up to the national level in 2005, in response to neoliberal policies that courted private investment in the sector. But as Rose Spalding has shown, anti-mining activism in El Salvador is rooted in community organizations that date to the late stages of the country's civil war, which ended in the early 1990s. Refugees who had fled massacres returned to villages that had largely been abandoned by the state and turned to collective self-governance as a form of survival. The result was a dense network of rural communities linked together in an umbrella organization—a powerful front of resistance when large-scale mining reached the extraction permit stage in 2004. In direct response to the national anti-mining

movement's demands, deputies of the left-wing FMLN introduced a bill to ban large-scale mining in 2006. Eleven years later, the law was adopted unanimously by El Salvador's legislature. A number of factors account for this success: dense organizational structures linking affected communities together; the movement's ability to frame the national conversation around impacts on the country's vulnerable water system; the innovative use of municipal *consultas* on mining (all of which registered community opposition); and the strong support of progressive Catholic bishops as well as FMLN deputies in congress. This dynamic, involving both the anti-mining movement and a political party, built on long-standing ties between rural community movements and the FMLN, was essential to channeling popular power into policy change.

Coda: A Note of Generosity

In the preceding pages, I surveyed the dilemmas confronting the Left-in-power and the Left-in-resistance in the context of an extractive model of accumulation and a state positioned on the periphery of the global economy. In Ecuador, these two forms of leftism confronted one another in a dispute that became so polarized that each saw in the other a political enemy more dangerous than neoliberalism. Lost in this internecine dispute was the radical promise of "twenty-first-century socialism": collective, democratic control over the conditions of socio-natural existence. Such a program could have coherently demanded *both* the redistribution of oil and mining revenues *and* a transition away from the extractive model of accumulation that generates those revenues. Just such a vision inflected CONAIE's 1994 political program, published amidst massive mobilizations against neoliberal land reforms, that called for a "planned ecological communitarian economy."[82] Yet two decades later, "socialism" and "anti-extractivism" had come to name two counterposed political projects. Socialism in Correa's usage meant state investment and spending in the pursuit of national development without transforming the model of accumulation or the class relations that it generates. Anti-extractivism referred to the militant defense of communities and ecosystems against the threat of oil extraction and mining without mobilizing the majority not immediately affected by social and environmental destruction.

As I write, in winter 2020, a resurgent right-wing threatens both of these leftist projects. Exacerbating the effects of the commodity bust and ensuing recession, austerity measures are reversing the socioeconomic gains of the previous decade. Investor-friendly reforms in the oil and mining sectors are already expanding extraction, devastating ecosystems, displacing indigenous popula-

tions, and contributing to climate change.[83] These trends are starkly apparent in the ostensibly leftist administration of President Moreno, which abandoned even Correa's minimal definition of socialism and changed the oil contract model to court foreign firms.[84] At the same time, the regional turn to the right, in both its conventionally neoliberal and more fascistic guises, is already facing challenges from the left and from below: the election of López Obrador in Mexico and of Alberto Fernández in Argentina, and the massive, militant protests against austerity policies in both Ecuador and Chile—which resulted in policy concessions from the Moreno and Piñera governments, respectively.

At this juncture, it is worth highlighting the urgent necessity of both the Left-in-power and the Left-in-resistance. For the foreseeable future, achieving socioeconomic equality on a livable planet constitutes the key political task for the hemisphere—and the globe. For all the limitations and contradictions of the Pink Tide, without the Left in power, political, social, and economic inequalities mutually reinforce one another, denying a dignified life to the vast majority of the population, and protecting the privileges of the few against the democratic will of the many.[85] For all of the challenges of building an anti-extractive mass movement, resistance against oil, coal, natural gas, and large-scale mining projects is absolutely vital if we are to avert the worst of climate chaos. Despite the potential for conflict between them, these two projects are fundamentally intertwined. Global warming deepens inequality within and between countries, undermining a core goal of leftist governments. And wresting political power from fossil capital and democratizing state institutions is a prerequisite for meaningful action on climate change and other forms of environmental devastation.[86]

What is the possibility of Latin American leftists reconstructing a viable political project that can weave together egalitarian and ecological demands? The future is, more than ever, uncertain and unpredictable. But if the past three decades of contentious politics in the region offer any indication, a neoliberal turn in governance combined with the ongoing intensification of resource extraction will transform the terrain of policymaking and protest. In this transformed context, we can expect militant activists to refashion their critiques, revise their strategies, and assemble new resource radicalisms.